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ARTICLE

RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS: THE AIDS INFLUENCE
Florise R. Neville-Ewell*
INTRODUCTION

Since 1981,1 Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
("AIDS")' has claimed the lives of approximately 171,890 people. 3
* Assistant Professor, Wayne State University Law School; B.A. 1981, J.D. 1984, Yale
University. Special thanks to my husband, Edward Ewell, Jr., Esq. and colleagues, Professors
Randall Johnson, John Mogk, and Michael Schill, who provided helpful criticism. I am particularly grateful to one other colleague, Professor Jessica Litman, who provided criticism and
encouragement. Finally, special thanks to student assistants Jean-Vierre Adams, Bryan M.
Beckermann, and Ren~e S. White.
1. 1981 represents the approximate date when the medical community started documenting AIDS cases. At least four cases were identified and documented in California. See
Michael S. Gottlieb et al., Pneumocystis Carinii; Pneumonia and Mucosal Candidiasis in
Previously Healthy Homosexual Men: Evidence of a New Acquired Cellular lmmunodeficiency, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1425 (1981); see also Henry Masur et al., An Outbreak
of Community-Acquired Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia: Initial Manifestation of Cellular
Immune Dysfunction, 305 NEW ENG. J.MED. 1431 (1981) (identifying eleven cases that arose
in New York City between 1979 and 1981).
2. AIDS is the term reserved for those individuals who have contracted the human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") and "have developed at least one well-defined, life-threatening
clinical condition that is clearly linked to HIV-induced immunosuppression." DONALD H.J.
HERMANN & WILLIAM P. SCHURGIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF AIDS § 1:06, at 8 (1991). As the
authors stated:
[HIVI [sic] is an RNA virus that was originally designated human T-lymphotrophic
virus (HTLV-III). It is part of a family of retroviruses whose existence in human
beings was just recently established. These viruses, which are widespread among
many animals, are characterized by their integration into host cells. The importance, both biologically and clinically, is the specificity of the interaction between
the virus and certain host cells which require the presence of a specific protein receptor to enable the process of viral infection to occur. The hallmark of HIV infection in AIDS is a selective depletion of certain helper/inducer T-lymphocytes or Thelper cells. These T-helper white blood cells are a primary part of the body's im-

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 5:301

This world renowned, 4 incurable' disease attacks and ultimately paralyzes its victims' immune systems. Despite the fact that the medical
community believes that AIDS cannot be contracted through casual
contact,' skeptics remain. 7 Indeed, the public's preoccupation with
AIDS has fueled a debate: whether, and under what circumstances,
mune system. In essence they are specialized white blood cells that help fight infection. The destruction of these important white blood cells eventually leads to a decline in the body's immune system. As a result of this so-called immunodeficiency,
the body becomes susceptible to a number of secondary infections associated with
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome or AIDS.
Id. § 1:05, at 7-8.
3. See CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC), HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 17
(1992). Specifically, since 1981, 2,267 children under thirteen and 169,623 adults, which includes adolescents over thirteen, have died from AIDS-related causes. In 1992, 235 children
and 23,176 adults died from AIDS. Id.
4. Since AIDS cases were first documented in 1981, they have been reported in approximately 136 countries and territories. Center for Disease Control, Update: Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Worldwide, 37 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY_ REP. 28688 (1988); see Robert M. Jarvis, Advocacy for AIDS Victims: An International American
Law Approach, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1988) (describing the rights of AIDS
victims under international law and the use of such laws in both national and international
courts).
5. See Kathryn Render, Tuberculosis Chapters:A Model for Future AIDS Legislation,
32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1145 (1987).
6. See Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1125 (1987). The authors concluded as follows:
The accumulated data strongly support the conclusion that transmission of HIV
occurs only through blood, sexual activity, and perinatal events. Nevertheless, the
fear of transmission by other routes may continue to increase with the anticipated
increase in the number of cases of AIDS over the next few years. An unrealistic
requirement for absolute certainty about the lack of transmission by other routes
persists, despite the knowledge that it is not scientifically possible to prove that an
event cannot occur. It remains difficult to believe that a virus that is spreading rapidly and may cause a cruel, frightening, and fatal disease is not highly contagious
and easily transmitted. The available data indicate that HIV transmission is not
highly efficient in a single or a few exposures, unless one receives a very large inoculum. The widespread dissemination of HIV is more likely the result of multiple,
repeated exposures over time by routes of transmission that are strongly related to
personal and cultural patterns of behavior-particularly, sexual activity and the use
of drugs. Isolated transmission events should be placed in full perspective by examining the results of population-based studies that provide rates of risk.
Id. at 1133; see also Center for Disease Control, Public Health Service Guidelinesfor Counseling and Antibody Testing to Prevent HIV Infection and AIDS, 36 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 509 (1987) (HIV is spread by sexual contact, parenteral exposure to blood
through needle-sharing, via infected mothers to their fetuses, and infrequently by occupational
exposure through needle-stick injury or mucous membrane exposure).
7. See David M. Freedman, Wrong Without Remedy, 72 A.B.A. J., June 1, 1986, at 36
(acknowledging that there will be people who have made up their minds that AIDS may be
contracted through casual contact and will not be dissuaded no matter what evidence is
produced).
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a person with AIDS ("PWA")8 should be required to disclose that
he is afflicted with the virus? 9
The same issue has arisen within the real estate' ° context:
Should the vendor of residential property" have an obligation to tell
a prospective purchaser that a recent occupant of the premises had
AIDS? Consider the following hypothetical:
John and Mary Abele were married for thirty years and had three
children. One year ago, John started losing his appetite. He also
had recurring flu-like symptoms. Concerned about John's constant
problems, Mary proposed that they retire, sell their house and
move to Florida. John liked Mary's idea and posted a "for sale by
owners" sign on their front lawn. Six months ago, Jerry and Margaret Mays submitted a purchase agreement to the Abeles with an
offer that the Abeles could not reject. One month before the Abeles
received the purchase agreement, John's physician told him that he
had AIDS. Last week, the day after Jerry and Margaret moved
into their new house, John died. The Mays' new neighbors greeted
them with open arms and John's obituary. The obituary states that
John died from complications associated with AIDS. The Mays
family has decided to sue Mary Abele for failing to disclose her
husband's condition.
In an attempt to discourage purchasers from filing such lawsuits,
states have attempted to resolve the disclosure issue through legislation.' 2 Nevertheless, the states' response to the debate has not been
8. According to the National Association of People With AIDS, "[t]he PWA
descriptor is the preferred name selected by people who have AIDS ..
" Rhonda R. Rivera,
Lawyers, Clients, and AIDS: Some Notes from the Trenches, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 883, 883 n.1
(1989).
9. See, e.g., State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (regarding obligation
to disclose and not intentionally expose sexual partners to HIV).
10. As defined, real estate includes "[hIand and anything permanently affixed to the
land, such as buildings, fences, and those things attached to the buildings, such as light fixtures, plumbing and heating fixtures, or other such items which would be personal property if
not attached. The term is generally synonymous with real property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1263 (6th ed. 1990). Throughout the text, the term real estate will be used interchangeably with real property and realty (a "brief term for real property or real estate"). Id. at 1264.
II. This article deals primarily with a discussion of the vendor's disclosure obligation
with respect to residential property. For a recent discussion of the general duty of disclosure in
a commercial context, see Frona M. Powell, The Seller's Duty to Disclose in Sales of Commercial Property, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 245 (1990). The real estate broker's or agent's disclosure
obligation, while relevant, since they are often involved in residential transactions, will not be
discussed. See infra note 22. For a general discussion of the broker's disclosure obligation, see
Paula C. Murray, AIDS, Ghosts, Murder: Must Real Estate Brokers and Sellers Disclose?,
27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689 (1992).
12. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 1710.2 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
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uniform. Existing disclosure statutes can be divided into four types."l
Type I statutes generally provide that information regarding an occupant within a household who has AIDS is immaterial, and preclude a claim against the vendor for nondisclosure.1 ' Type II statutes
also preclude a claim against the vendor for nondisclosure, unless the

purchaser makes a specific inquiry. 5
The third category of statutes combines certain aspects of the
preceding two types of legislation. Like Type I statutes, Type III
statutes' 6 provide that the information is immaterial,1 7 and preclude
a claim against the vendor.' 8 Additionally, Type III statutes give a
purchaser the opportunity to make specific inquiries of the vendor
regarding an occupant's medical status.' 9 However, unlike Type II
statutes, Type III statutes do not require the vendor to answer,"0
thus, enabling a vendor to refuse to respond to the purchaser's direct
request.
§ 38-35.5-101 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. §§ 20-329cc to 20-329ff (West
Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1936(0(1) (Michie Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 689.25 (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-16 (Michie 1991); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 467-14(18) (1992); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 225, § 455/31.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 207.250 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1468 (West
Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 16-322.1 (1992); MD. CODE ANN., REAL
PROP. § 2-120 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.565 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 39-50, 42-14.2 (Michie Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-513 (West
Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 93.275 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-270 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1992); TENN CODE ANN. § 66-5-110 (Supp. 1992); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6573a, § 15(c) (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-1-1(4), 57-1-37 (Supp. 1992);
S.B. No. 138, Ist Reg. Sess. § 10 (1991) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.030.10).
Most of the statutes deal with owner/seller and broker/salesperson liability.
13. The existing statutes were broken down into four categories. Statutes were organized
by looking at (I) the individuals affected by the statute (i.e. vendor, agent, or both), and (2)
the disclosure requirement, if any, placed upon those individuals.
14. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1936(0; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.25; Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 207.250; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1468; MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 2-120; NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.565; OR. REV. STAT. § 93.275; TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-110; UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 57"1-1(4)(b), 57-1-37. All of these statutes, except for the Tennessee statute,
provide that the information is immaterial.
15. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710.2(d); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-16(2); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 39-50; S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-270(D). These statutes are not uniform in stating that information regarding an occupant's affliction with HIV or AIDS is immaterial. Compare CAL.
CIv. CODE § 1710.2(d) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-50.
16. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN §§ 20-329cc to 20-329ff; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59,
§ 858-513.
17. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-329cc, 20-329dd(a); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59,
§ 858-513A.
18. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-329dd(b); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-513B.
19. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-329ee; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-513C.
20. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-329ee; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-513C.
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The Type IV statutes only apply to a real estate "licensee" and
preclude a claim against a broker or salesperson who fails to disclose
an occupant's medical status. 1 Thus, Type IV statutes do not provide protection for the vendor.
None of the states has adequately resolved the debate concerning the vendor's disclosure obligation. Effective legislation in this
area must reflect a balance of the following three competing interests: (1) the typical prospective purchaser's interest in gaining access
to any information that might affect the realty's value, including
knowledge that the vendor had AIDS; (2) the vendor's privacy interest in withholding the fact that he has AIDS from public scrutiny;
and (3) the state's interests in upholding anti-discrimination laws
and controlling the AIDS epidemic. 2
None of the existing statutes balances all of the relevant concerns. Type I statutes are comprehensive and balance the three competing interests most effectively.23 Conversely, Type IV statutes are
the most deficient because, unlike the other statutes, they do not preclude the purchaser from stating a cause of action against the vendor. 4 Thus, Type IV statutes neglect to include one of the significant
participants in a real estate transaction.
Although none of the statutes balances all of the competing interests, the statutes have varying degrees of effectiveness. From the
purchaser's perspective, the Type I statutes are the worst. These
statutes preclude the purchaser from forcing the seller to reveal
AIDS-specific information.15 Type I statutes also resolve the ambivalent purchaser's dilemma of trying to gain access to this type of
knowledge by removing it from the pool of available information.
21. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-35.5-101 (includes information regarding the
occupant's medical status as well as whether the property was the site of a homicide, other
felony, or a suicide); HAW. REV. STAT. § 467-14(18) (includes information regarding the fact
that an occupant has AIDS); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 225, § 455/31.1 (includes information
regarding the occupant's medical status or any act or occurrence that did not affect the property's physical condition).
22. Most importantly, the identified interests reflect an attempt to isolate the individuals
who would be most affected by the legislation (i.e. the vendor and the purchaser). The interests
also reflect a recognition of the fact that a disclosure law concerning AIDS cannot be examined in isolation. Instead, the law must encompass preexisting laws concerning privacy
rights and anti-discrimination, as well as the state's interests.
23. See supra note 14.
24. Unlike the other statutes, Type IV statutes fail to protect the vendor as well as the
agent. Providing exclusive protection to the agent is insufficient in our litigious society. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
25. However, Type I statutes fail to provide the vendor with guidance about how he
should proceed if the purchaser makes an inquiry. See supra note 14.
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Types II and III statutes give a purchaser the opportunity to
acquire AIDS-specific information about a seller.2 6 Thus, a purchaser would prefer these statutes over Type I statutes. However,
between Types II and III, a purchaser would prefer Type II statutes
because they require a vendor to give a truthful answer if asked
whether he has AIDS." A purchaser would dislike Type III statutes
relative to the Type II statutes because Type III statutes allow a
vendor to refuse to respond to a purchaser's inquiry. A purchaser
who acquired the realty without a broker would also like the Type
IV statutes because they do not preclude a purchaser from stating a
cause of action against the vendor.
From the vendor's perspective, the Type I statutes are the best
because they provide the most protection. They make AIDS-specific
information immaterial and effectively allow the vendor to refuse to
address the inquiry.28 Types II and IV statutes are the worst for the
vendor, although for different reasons. The Type II statutes require
the vendor to respond to a direct inquiry, thereby taking away the
vendor's ability to control the publication of his confidential information. The Type IV statutes are also problematic for the vendor since
they only provide protection for the vendor's agents. 9
From the vendor's perspective, the most effective legislation
must preclude the prospective purchaser from successfully suing the
vendor for nondisclosure, like the Type I statutes.30 The legislation
must also enable the vendor to seek punitive damages against any
person who obtains AIDS-specific information from the vendor and
uses it to the vendor's detriment. Types II and III fail in both respects to adequately consider the vendor's position.31
From the state's perspective, the Type I statutes are the best
because they support the state's dual interests in upholding anti-discrimination laws and controlling the AIDS epidemic. 32 These stat26.
27.

See supra notes 15-16.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710.2(d); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-16(2); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 39-50; S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-270(D).
28. The Type I statutes preclude a cause of action from being stated against the vendor,
but do not provide the vendor with guidance about how he should proceed. See supra note 25.
Presumably, the vendor can simply assert that, given the statute, any response is unnecessary.
The Type V statute attempts to provide the vendor with guidance by absolutely prohibiting a
disclosure. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
29. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 14.
31. See supra note 26.
32. See infra notes 176-215 and accompanying text. However, to promote the state's
interests, imposing a penalty upon violators may be necessary. See infra note 251 and accom-
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utes help the state fulfill its first obligation by withdrawing such information from the pool of material information available to the
prospective purchaser. If not disclosed, or at risk of being disclosed,
it cannot have a discriminatory effect.
Type I disclosure legislation, which deems AIDS-related information immaterial and makes it inaccessible to the public, also furthers a state's public health obligation. Assuming that the state is
interested in educating the public and providing incentives to encourage PWAs to seek treatment, it must enact laws which are consistent with those goals. Only the Type I statutes promote such goals
by not unnecessarily requiring disclosure. Types II and III have the
opposite effect. They undermine a state's attempts to accomplish its
public health goals since the AIDS-specific information can be
placed into the public domain. Thus, a PWA may feel even more
vulnerable and less inclined to participate in the state's detection and
33
treatment services.
Effective disclosure legislation is needed because this debate is
raging, particularly in the real estate context.3 4 Accordingly, this article seeks to propose ways to enhance existing disclosure legislation.
Part I identifies and examines the competing interests and related
issues underlying the debate.3 5 Part II examines the problems with
existing legislation and identifies attributes for model disclosure legislation. 36 Part III proposes a prototype, a Type V statute, 7 which
will enhance the Type I statute.
PART

A.

I:

ANALYSIS OF COMPETING INTERESTS

Purchaser's Interest in Realty's Components of Value:
Vendor's Disclosure Obligation8

A typical prospective purchaser, like the hypothetical Mays
panying text.
33. See Gary James Wood & Alice Philipson, AIDS Testing and Privacy: An Analysis
of Case Histories, 2 AIDS AND PUB. POLICY J. 21, 22 (1987) (stating that "confidential testing encourages citizens to participate in epidemiological studies ....
). Thus, requiring disclosure when information will not be held in confidence, see infra note 56, makes the PWA
feel more vulnerable.
34. The disclosure legislation was discussed at the August, 1992 annual meeting of the
American Bar Association.
35. See infra notes 38-215 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 216-47 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 248-52 and accompanying text.
38. The law regarding this issue is quite broad. This article addresses this issue from
only one perspective: the duty of a vendor, like the Abele family, to disclose material facts that
they might otherwise withhold. See supra note 11.
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family, is interested in making the best bargain with the vendor. In
common parlance, the purchaser wants to get a good deal by paying
the least amount of money for the real estate. Accomplishing that
goal depends upon the purchaser's ability to identify the realty's
weaknesses 9 so that the vendor will lower the purchase price.
To bargain effectively and accomplish this ultimate goal, the
prospective purchaser must discern the realty's components of value.
Components of value comprise the intrinsic or extrinsic factors4 0 that
either directly concern the realty, thereby affecting its habitability,
or indirectly impact upon the realty, thereby affecting its suitability.
Two types of components can be formulated. The positive components of value, like a newly finished kitchen or neighborhood amenities, enhance the realty and make it attractive to the prospective purchaser. The vendor has an incentive to disclose these components
because they add value to the realty.
Negative components of value, however, make the realty less
desirable to the prospective purchaser. These components include
physical defects, like defective wiring, a leaky roof, or an encumbrance, as well as other "defects"'" that offend the purchaser be39. The vendor is one of the prospective purchaser's main information sources. The prospective purchaser can also use an inspector or experienced builder to help to identify the
realty's structural defects. Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 578 P.2d 637, 638-39
(Colo. 1978) (experienced builder is in the best position to help buyer detect structural
defects).
40. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic facts is as follows:
And there is often a material distinction between circumstances, which are intrinsic,
and form the very ingredients of the contract, and circumstances which are extrinsic, and form no part of it, although they create inducements to enter into it, or
affect the value or price of the thing sold. Intrinsic circumstances are properly those
which belong to the nature, character, title, safety, use or enjoyment of the subjectmatter of the contract; such as natural or artificial defects in the subject-matter.
Extrinsic circumstances are properly those which are accidentally connected with it,
rather bear upon it, at the time of the contract, and may enhance or diminish its
value or price, or operate as a motive to mike or decline the contract; such as facts
respecting .. .the character of the neighborhood .. .or like circumstances.
W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealmentand Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20-21 & n.48
(1936) (citing STORY. EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 210 (5th ed. 1849)).
41. Historically, defects discussed in connection with realty concerned concrete or physical defects like those referenced earlier in the text. See infra notes 63, 74 and accompanying
text. Under modern analysis, if they are deemed "material" defects, the vendor must disclose
them. See infra notes 67-108 and accompanying text. Given modern thought, however, such a
limited definition of defects is inaccurate. Defects must also include the realty's other potential
problems, which problems will only arise on an individual basis because their existence depends upon the purchaser's perception. See infra notes 98-108, 170 and accompanying text.
Thus, while it may be difficult to endorse this expanded definition of defects, it is more
accurate.
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cause of his idiosyncracies or practical concerns about the value of
his bargain.4 2 Concern about the AIDS virus, and the extent to
which one risks being exposed to the AIDS virus if a former occupant had the ailment, falls within the latter category. The vendor
lacks an incentive to disclose either type of defect because they devalue the realty, although the purchaser may be extremely interested
43
in ascertaining such information.
A schism exists between information that would reveal all of the
components of value and material information that the vendor is legally obligated to disclose. The current state of the law makes it
difficult to predict that portion of the pool of information concerning
the realty that the vendor must reveal. Since AIDS-specific information indirectly concerns the realty, it is particularly difficult to assess
its discoverability. However, doctrine provides a starting point. Accordingly, determining whether the Abele family must disclose depends upon which theory of disclosure is being applied. Three theories of a vendor's disclosure obligation have evolved:" 1) the classical
model, based upon the common law rule of caveat emptor; 5 2) the
modern model, based upon the principles of good faith and fair deal42. Prospective home buyers in California regarded certain homes as being defective
because their former occupants had AIDS. Wood & Philipson, supra note 33, at 24 (information compiled from attorneys working on the AIDS Legal Referral Panel of Bay Area Lawyers
for Individual Freedom in San Francisco, Calif.; case histories arose out of lawsuits which had
not settled). In early 1985, a number of homes once occupied by gay men entered the real
estate market in San Francisco. Id. "'Some of the homes were owned by gay men still living on
the premises; others were held by the estates of men who had died from AIDS." Id. A few
prospective buyers made it clear to their real estate agents and brokers that they would not
purchase homes that were once occupied by men who had AIDS. Id. As a result, most of the
major brokerage houses required HIV disclosures. Id. In addition, during this period, numerous homes sold for less than fair market value and numerous estates were held in probate
pending the almost impossible sale of real property. Id.
43. See infra notes 166-70, 220 and accompanying text.
44. It is more appropriate to talk about the evolutionary process of the vendor's disclosure duty because there is no jurisdictional consensus. Comments made some years ago still
apply:
Countless cases deal with the nondisclosure by a vendor of realty of defects in the
property itself. The courts seem to be anything but unanimous in their decisions,
some adhering to the harsh rule of "no duty", others apparently willing to make an
exception in the case of severe defects, especially if they are latent and not readily
discoverable even by a diligent purchaser. It is not really possible to reconcile the
decisions.
William B. Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-PurchaserRelation, 8 W. RES.
L. REV. 5, 14 (1956); see Leon Rittenberg III, Comment, Louisiana's Tenfold Approach to
the Duty to Inform, 66 TUL. L. REv 151, 156 (1991) (models of "duty to inform have evolved
from conceptual models of individual responsibility").
45. See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
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ing;" and 3) the economic model, based upon the premise that dis7
closures should be made by the cheapest mistake preventer.
1. Classical Duty to Disclose
The classical model reflects the common law rule of caveat
emptor.4 8 Under this model, the law is premised on the freedom of
contract theory49 and shaped by an individualistic philosophy." The
deed represents the parties' total agreement." Upon its transfer to
the purchaser, the purchaser assumes all of the risks.5 No implied
warranties remain.53 Thus, after the transfer of the deed, the vendor
cannot be held liable,54 unless one of the exceptions to the common
46. See infra notes 67-108 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
48. Caveat emptor means "let the buyer beware." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th
ed. 1979). The maxim summarizes the rule that a purchaser must examine, judge, and test for
himself. Id. Proceeding on the assumption that the parties were involved in an arm's length
transaction, the buyer was left to his own devices to make the best bargain. Purchasers could
not prevail even if the vendor failed to make material disclosures regarding the realty's defects.
See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 644-45 (1941).
49. Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1183
(1931).
50. Id. at 1186; see Keeton, supra note 40, at 5.
51. The merger doctrine underlies the doctrine of caveat emptor. Under the doctrine "a
contract merges into the deed, and once the deed is accepted, the deed is deemed the final act
of the parties expressing the terms of their agreement." JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER,
PROPERTY 580 (2d ed. 1988); see Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689, 701 (S.D. Fla.
1979); Knudson v. Weeks, 394 F. Supp. 963, 976 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Pybus v. Grasso, 59
N.E.2d 289, 291 (Mass. 1945); Smith v. Vehrs, 242 P.2d 586, 591 (Or. 1952); Miles v.
Mackle Bros., 242 N.W.2d 247, 249-50 (Wis. 1976). The goal is "to resolve all real property
problems by looking to only one recorded document and to make that document carry all of
the limitations of the transaction so that the whole world can know the complete contours of
the deal." DAVID WHALEY, WARRANTIES AND THE PRACTITIONER 229 (1981).
52. In Palmore v. Morris, Tasker & Co., 37 A. 995 (Pa. 1897) the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania stated:
Before he purchased the real estate the law presume[d] [that] the grantee [had]
examined the property, and was cognizant of its situation, surroundings, the character of the structures upon it, and their condition of repair. Without an express covenant by the grantors, as between them and the grantee, there was no duty on the
grantors to repair. The purchaser thereafter assumed that duty because he then
became the owner and occupant.
Id. at 998-99.
53. Id.
54. Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 42 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1942). In Swinton, the
purchaser asserted that the vendor had failed to disclose damage caused by termite infestations. Even though the court found that the vendor -was aware of the damage and knew it was
not readily apparent to the purchaser, the court refused to hold the vendor liable for the nondisclosure. Although the court acknowledged the case's moral appeal, the court believed that
"[t]he law ha[d] not yet ... reached the point of imposing upon the frailties of human nature
a standard so idealistic.. " Id. at 809. Swinton is often cited because of the court's strict

19931

THE AIDS INFLUENCE

law rule applies."' Specifically, the vendor can be held liable if he is
a fiduciary, 56 engages in deceit, 7 delivers an express warranty, 8 or
withholds information about a concealed unreasonably dangerous

condition.

9

adherence to the common law rule. See Sanders v. White, 476 So. 2d 84 (Ala. 1985) (no duty
to disclose defective roof); Ray v. Montgomery, 399 So. 2d 230 (Ala. 1980) (no duty to disclose termite infestation); Gegeas v. Sherril, 147 A.2d 223 (Md. 1958) (no duty to disclose
termite infestation); Solomon v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (Mass. 1985) (no duty to disclose
cracks in house); Kuczmanksi v. Gill, 302 S.E.2d 48 (Va. 1983) (vendor not liable for nondisclosure of defective gutter and rotten bathroom floors).
55. "To the general rule that a seller has no duty to disclose material facts to the purchaser, the common law [has] recognized certain exceptions and, throughout the Twentieth
Century, courts continued to develop various mitigating qualifications." Richard M. Jones,
Risk Allocation and the Sale of Defective Used Housing in Ohio-Should Silence Be
Golden?, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 215, 218 (1991); see Serena Kafker, Sell and Tell: The Fall and
Revival of The Rule on Nondisclosure in Sales of Used Real Property, 12 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 57, 59 (1986); Renee D. Braeunig, Note, Johnson v. Davis: New Liability for Fraudulent
Nondisclosure in Real Property Transactions, I1 NOVA L. REV. 145, 148 (1986); Ronald
Basso, Note, Reed v. King: Fraudulent Nondisclosure of a Multiple Murder in a Real Estate
Transaction, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 877, 882 (1984); Aaron P. Morris, Note, Vendors of Real
Estate: When Does Liability for Dangerous Conditions End?, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 23, 27
(1987). One author prefers to call them "qualifications" as opposed to exceptions. See Goldfarb, supra note 44, at 10.
56. Keeton, supra note 40, at 11; see also Leo Bearman, Jr., Caveat Emptor in Sales of
Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L REV. 541, 561 (1961). According to
Keeton, "[i]t is frequently stated in the decisions that the law imposes no duty on the party to
a transaction to disclose information in the absence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship:
such as principal and agent, trustee and cestui, parent and child, guardian and ward, and
attorney and client." Keeton, supra note 40, at 11. The typical vendor-purchaser relationship
is not a fiduciary relationship. See id. at 12; see also Goldfarb, supra note 44, at 40.
57. Hamilton, supra note 49, at 1174. This suggests that the purchaser "is induced to
buy through some false statement of fact about the quality or fitness for use of the realty or
building, spoken by the vendor with knowledge that it was false and with intent to deceive the
purchaser ....
Bearman, supra note 56, at 561.
58. Keeton, supra note 40, at 39.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965). Section 353 provides as follows:
(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition,
whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on the
land, is subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the land with the consent
of the vendee or his subvendee for physical harm caused by the condition after the
vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the
risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes or
should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that the vendee will not
discover the condition or realize the risk.
(2) If the vendor actively conceals the condition, the liability stated in Subsection
(1) continues until the vendee discovers it and has reasonable opportunity to take
effective precautions against it. Otherwise, the liability continues only until the vendee has had reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and take such
precautions.
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Applying the doctrine of caveat emptor to the Abele/Mays hypothetical, the Abele family would not have a duty to reveal John's
virus to the Mays family. A disclosure would neither be required
under the common law rule, nor under one of the classic exceptions.
Because the Abeles are not fiduciaries, 60 they cannot be compelled to
disclose under the fiduciary exception to the common law rule."1
Likewise, because there is no evidence of conscious deceit or of an
express warranty, since the Abeles did not make any statements regarding John's health, these exceptions 2 are inapplicable.
The Mays' last resort is to assert that John Abele's condition
infected the realty and made it unreasonably dangerous.6 3 Under
this exception, a vendor can be subject to tort liability if the purchaser can establish that the defect existed at the time of sale, that
the vendor knew or had reason to know of its existence,6 and that
the concealed condition involved an unreasonable danger.6 5 However,
this exception is also inapplicable because scientific evidence does
not support the conclusion that a residence formerly occupied by a
PWA is unreasonably dangerous. 6 Thus, the classic exceptions to
the doctrine of caveat emptor are inapplicable.
See also Christy v. Prestige Builders, Inc., 329 N.W.2d 748, 752 n.7 (Mich. 1982); Jones,
supra note 55, at 219.
60. Historically, the vendor-purchaser relationship has not been regarded as a fiduciary
one. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
61. Since disclosure cannot be compelled where there is no fiduciary relationship between the parties, this assertion is limited. However, even if a fiduciary relationship existed,
there is no certainty that the present circumstances would trigger a duty to disclose.
62. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Numerous cases have held vendors liable
for failure to disclose an unreasonably dangerous condition which threatens the purchaser's
health. See, e.g., Shane v. Hoffmann, 324 A.2d 532 (Pa. 1974) (sewer problems inundated a
home's basement with human excrement and other waste material and was held to have
threatened the purchasers' health).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 59, § 353(1).
"[R]eason to know" [means] that [the vendor] has information from which a person
of reasonable intelligence, or of his own superior intelligence, would infer that the
condition exists, or would govern his conduct on the assumption that it does exist,
and would realize that its existence will involve an unreasonable risk of physical
harm to persons on the land.
Id. at 236, cmt. b.
65. One court recently stated that the degree of danger depends on many factors, including the likely use of the property. Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 978 (E.D.
Mich. 1991).
66. Such an assertion would have to be premised on scientific evidence that the retroviruses that cause HIV linger within the realty and can be contracted by subsequent inhabitants. No support exists for such an argument. See supra note 6.
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2.

Modern Duty to Disclose

The modern model of disclosure has not displaced the classical
model, but has expanded it in two respects. First, the modern model
broadens the vendor's obligation towards the purchaser.6 7 It replaces
the focus on shrewd individualism 8 with a focus on equity, fairness,
good faith, and fair dealing.6 9 The vendor is increasingly perceived
as having an ethical obligation to the purchaser to make disclosures
that will help the latter get the benefit of his bargain."0 Nondisclosure and the suppression of material facts are synonymous with a
fraudulent misrepresentation. 1
The modern model also reflects an expansion of the classic ca67. This new view departs from the classical model. As the court noted in Johnson v.
Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985):
In determining whether a seller of a home has a duty to disclose latent material
defects to a buyer, the earlier common law consistently imposed an ability upon the
commission of affirmative acts of harms, but shrank from converting the courts into
an institution for forcing men to help one another. This distinction [between malfeasance and nonfeasance] is deeply rooted in our case law .... Where failure to disclose a material fact is calculated to induce a false belief, the distinction between
concealment and affirmative representations is tenuous. Both proceed from the same
motives and are attended with the same consequences; both are violative of the principles of fair dealing and good faith; both are calculated to produce the same result;
and, in fact, both essentially have the same effect.
Id. at 627-28. However, although the vendor's duty reflects an expansion of American common
law, its theoretical basis is not novel. As early as the nineteenth century, Pothier envisioned
such a disclosure obligation for the vendor because of the principle of good faith. See infra
note 76 and accompanying text.
68. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 5; see also PROSSER, supra note 48, at 722.
69. See Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 628.
70. The "freedom of contract principle has eroded somewhat as a consequence of both
the regulatory impact of public law on real estate transactions and the emerging trend toward
striking down bargains that are either unconscionable or offensive to public policy." MICHAEL
T. MADISON & ROBERT M. ZINMAN, MODERN REAL ESTATE FINANCE: A TRANSACTIONAL
APPROACH 3 (1991).
71. See, e.g., Correa v. Maggiore, 482 A.2d 192, 196 (N.J. 1984);-cf. Goldfarb, supra
note 44, at 6-7. Goldfarb stated that:
The courts and commentators treat actionable silence or, as it is more often denominated, "actionable nondisclosure" as a variety of misrepresentation. It is one of the
implied theses of the present inquiry that it is not logical, or even helpful, to do so.
True, under some circumstances, a failure to speak may amount to the equivalent of
an actual, verbal representation of fact. Silence is, after all, a type of conduct, or at
least of forbearance. If the representation thus implied is, in fact, false, and if the
other elements of fraud are present, the plaintiff ought to be entitled to a remedy.
But, under many circumstances, silence is merely silence. It says nothing. The silent
party may fail to deny or assert a given fact. But it may be unfair and unreasonable
to label his behavior as a representation, much less a misrepresentation. And yet,
even under such circumstances, the silence may be tortious.
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veat emptor exceptions to conform to modern standards."2 Under
this model, in addition to dangerous latent defects, v3 latent defects
which affect the property's market value or desirability must be disclosed.74 Thus, effectively, a pool of material information that the
72. In Wilhite v. Mays, 232 S.E.2d 141 (Ga. App. Ct. 1976), affid, 235 S.E.2d 532 (Ga.
1977), the court justified disregarding caveat emptor.
The rule of caveat emptor . . . is a statement of the mores of medieval through
nineteenth-century England (and America) and apparently worked well in agricultural societies ....
However, the sale of farm acreage . . . -the type of transaction
to which caveat emptor originally addressed itself-is very different from the sale of
a modern home, with complex plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and electrical
systems....
Id. at 142-43 (emphasis added); see also Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 628, where in its comparison
of philosophies used to decide cases under the classical model as compared to the modern
model, the Supreme Court of Florida stated:
These unappetizing cases are not in tune with the times and do not conform with
current notions of justice, equity and fair dealing. One should not be able to stand
behind the impervious shield of caveat emptor and take advantage of another's ignorance. Our courts have taken great strides since the days when judicial emphasis
was on rigid rules and ancient precedents. Modern concepts of justice and fair dealing have given our courts the opportunity and latitude to change legal precepts in
order to conform to society's needs. Thus, the tendency of the more recent cases has
been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor. The law appears
to be working toward the ultimate conclusion that full disclosure of all material
facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct demands it.
73. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
74. A line of cases hold that a seller's failure to disclose a defect known to him and not
to the purchaser entitles the latter to damages or rescission. See MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY 49 (5th ed. 1991). These cases,
... bas[e] [the] purchaser's claim on negligent or reckless nondisclosure rather than
caveat emptor. Seller is not excused by purchaser's agreement to take the property
"as is." These cases generally involve material conditions not discoverable by purchaser by ordinary care and diligence ....
Under this rule the risk of latent defects
that are unknown to either party falls on the purchaser. But mutual mistake by
seller and buyer of the existence of a building defect permitted rescission of a contract of sale. A moderate amount of "puffing" is deemed neither material nor actionable. On the other hand a purchaser is under no duty to tell seller facts known
to purchaser and not to seller ...
Id. at 52-54 (citations omitted). Friedman defines this line of cases to include cases involving
dangerous latent defects. Id. at 49.
This article differentiates this line of cases from the earlier ones, particularly those involving dangerous latent defects, because cases under the modern model reflect a change in the
judiciary's views. Failing to disclose dangerous latent defects has been condemned for some
time. See Cutter v. Hamlen, 18 N.E. 397 (Mass. 1888) (lessor's failure to disclose that the
house was infected with diphtheria). Yet, under the modern model, courts have decided in
favor of the purchasers under the explicit or implicit premise that fair dealing and justice
require disclosure. See, e.g., Clauser v. Taylor, 112 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1941) (seller failed to
disclose that two residential lots had been filled with debris and that, in that condition, the cost
of the building on them was materially increased); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68 (N.J.
1974) (seller failed to disclose a serious cockroach infestation, which could only have been
discovered when the lights were out because cockroaches are nocturnal creatures); Gilbey v.
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vendor must disclose has been created in the interest of upholding
the principles of good faith and fair dealing.
The principles of good faith and fair dealing are used to promote equitable standards of behavior for parties involved in contracts
of sale.7 5 One view of the principle of good faith was stated by
Pothier early in the nineteenth century:
[G]ood faith not only forbids the assertion of falsehood, but also all
reservation concerning that which the person with whom we contract has an interest in knowing, touching the thing which is the
object of the contract.
The reason is that equity and justice, in these contracts, consists in equality. It is evident that any reservation, by one of the
contracting parties, concerning any circumstance which the other
has an interest in knowing, touching the object of the contract, is
fatal to this equality: for the moment the one acquires a knowledge
of this object superior to the other, he has an advantage over the
other in contracting; he knows better what he is doing than the
other; and consequently, equality is no longer found in the contract.
In applying these principles to the contract of sale, it follows
that the vendor is obliged to disclose every circumstance within his
knowledge touching the thing which the vendee has an interest in
knowing and that he sins against that good faith which ought to
reign in this contract, if he conceals any such circumstance from
6
7

him.

According to Pothier, a vendor must disclose material information to
guarantee equality in the bargaining process. Therefore, if the vendor fails to act in good faith, and withholds valuable information
from the purchaser about the object of the contract, the parties cannot bargain on an equal basis.
Professor Keeton also embraces the moralistic philosophy underlying the modern model. Keeton's position is that the duty to disCooper, 310 N.E.2d 268 (Ohio Ct. of C.P. 1973) (sellers and broker failed to disclose that
certain permanent and temporary easements encumbered the property).
Scholars have attempted to identify those factors that influence the courts, recognizing
that materiality is a principal element of any action based upon a fraudulent misrepresentation. W. Page Keeton, Actionable Misrepresentation: Legal Fault as a Requirement, II. Rescission, 2 OKLA. L. REV. 56, 59 (1936). The factors have been outlined in a variety of ways.
See, e.g.. Braeunig, supra note 55, at 155; Kafker, supra note 55, at 60; Morris, supra note 55,
at 27.
75. These principles have been endorsed by the American Law Institute. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1979).
76. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 185-86 n.c (1817) (quoting POTHIER. DE
VENTE No. 233).
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close should be required "whenever justice, equity and fair dealing
demand it."" He asserts that the disclosure obligation should apply
to all circumstances where "unfair conduct" 78 will' result if one of
the parties to the transaction does not speak.
Thus, the modern model is a composite of a myriad of philosophies. Although not all courts have advocated a philosophy as broad
as Professor Keeton's,7 9 some courts have endorsed and promoted the
underlying principles of good faith and fair dealing.8 0 For example,
in Lingsch v. Savage,8" the purchasers brought an action in fraud
against the sellers and the sellers' broker for failing to disclose that
the realty was in a state of disrepair, contained illegal units, and had
been set for condemnation by the city. 2 Although the case was remanded, the Lingsch court articulated the elements of the cause of
action. The court stated:
The elements of a cause of action for damages for fraud based on
mere nondisclosure and involving no confidential relationship would
therefore appear to be the following: (1) Nondisclosure by the defendant of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the
property; (2) Defendant's knowledge of such facts and of their being unknown to or beyond the reach of the plaintiff; (3) Defendant's intention to induce action by the plaintiff; (4) Inducement of
the plaintiff to act by reason of the nondisclosure; and (5) Resulting damages.83
The first two elements 4 of the claim for nondisclosure reflect
the court's commitment to the principles of good faith and fair dealing. The first two elements require the plaintiff to establish three
factors: (1) facts materially affecting the real property's value or desirability; (2) the vendor's exclusive knowledge of such facts;8 5 and
(3) nondisclosure of those facts by the vendor.8 " Fundamentally, if
77. Keeton, supra note 40, at 31.
78. Id.
79. PROSSER, supra note 48, at 725 n.39 (citing Keeton, Fraud-Concealmentand NonDisclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31-40 (1936)).
80. Some courts have explicitly endorsed Professor Keeton's position. See Weintraub,
317 A.2d at 72; Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672 (Wash. 1960) (vendors were obligated to
disclose termite infestation to purchasers).
81. 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1963).
82. Id. at 203.
83. Id. at 206.
84. The other elements are standard in establishing a fraud claim. See, e.g., Globe Int'l,
Inc. v. Superior Ct., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109, 112 (Ct. App. 1992).
85. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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the vendor withholds material information about the property which
is otherwise unavailable to the purchaser, the purchaser is placed in
an unequal bargaining position. The purchaser cannot make reasona87
ble bids on the property because he has not been fully informed.
This outcome benefits the vendor, but is unfair to the buyer. By
withholding information, the vendor fails to act in good faith. It follows that there cannot be any fair dealing, since all of the relevant
information has not been disclosed. 88
Other courts, like the Supreme Court of Florida in Johnson v.
Davis8 9 have endorsed Lingsch.9 0 The Lingsch9 1 case and its progeny9 2 have established a more onerous burden for the vendor. Although these courts do not impose implied warranties upon a vendor,
the disclosure requirement, nonetheless, reflects a "policy rather similar in its purpose to that which imposes implied warranties of quality. . . .". These courts require a vendor to make disclosures if the
purchaser lacks access to material information. To the extent that
the vendor fails to make disclosures, courts hold the vendor
94
accountable.
The courts' opinions are consistent with Pothier's position. Each
court is effectively taking the position that the real property's material components of value 9 5 are significant. To the extent that a vendor has exclusive knowledge and withholds information regarding
one of the negative components of value, thereby placing the purchaser in an inferior bargaining position, 96 the court must
97
intercede.
87. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
89. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1986).
90. The Johnson court endorsed the philosophy underlying Lingsch. The Supreme Court
of Florida concluded that the seller has a duty to disclose all known facts "materially affecting
the value of the property .. " The court did not include those facts that affect the property's
"desirability." See id. at 629.
91. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
92. See Posner v. Davis, 395 N.E.2d 133 (I11.
App. Ct. 1979) (basement flood, rotten
basement stairs and other water damage); Weintraub, 317 A.2d 68 (roach infestation);
Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1982) (cracked foundation and walls); see also
Johnson, 480 So. 2d 625.

93.

PROSSER,

supra note 48, at 724-25.

94. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
97. This approach is unlike the one used by courts utilizing the classical model. See
Swinton, 42 N.E.2d at 809. As stated by the Supreme Court of Florida, if the courts did not
assume such a position, parties would be charged with the responsibility of making their own

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:301

The problem with the vendor's new disclosure duty, however, is
that it inhibits the vendor from determining, with any consistency,
what he must disclose. Accordingly, in some respects the Lingsch
opinion makes it unnecessary to differentiate between what the purchaser wants to know-namely, all of the components of value-and
what the vendor must disclose-namely, all the material components
of value. Under the modern model, the pool of available information
is quite large. Courts are struggling to determine the scope of the
materiality element98 by continuing to ask which facts must be disclosed to the purchaser.
The Lingsch court stated that the vendor is obligated to disclose
facts which are of sufficient materiality to "[affect] the value or desirability of the property. . ... -9 Implicit in this statement is a conclusion that the California materiality standard is both objective and
subjective. If the property's value is used as a barometer, an objective materiality standard is applied. The value of an omitted fact and
its impact upon the realty can be determined by looking at objective
criteria; specifically, the cost of repairing the defect and the extent to
which it devalues the realty.
Alternatively, if "desirability" 10 0 is the gauge, a more subjective
standard is being applied. In that case, the purchaser's own tastes or
needs are used as a barometer. Since tastes vary, however, it is difficult to predict or quantify the value of those tastes.'
The California materiality standard was applied in Reed v.
King.10 2 In Reed, the purchaser of a home brought an action against
the vendors and their agent for rescission and damages.' 0 3 The complaint alleged that the vendors had a duty to disclose that a woman
and her four children had been murdered in the home ten years earbargains. See Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 628.
98. It is futile to attempt to dispose of the materiality issue. Two lines of thought exist.
First, the objective view, as illustrated by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a)
(1977), provides that a fact is "material" if "a reasonable man would attach importance to its
existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction ..
" This
reasonable person analysis does not allow the individual's idiosyncrasies to affect the court's
final assessment. In contrast, see discussion of Lingsch v. Savage, supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
99. 29 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
100. Id.
101. Authors have been critical of the use of a subjective standard. See, e.g., Braeunig,
supra note 55, at 161.
102. 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1983); see also Sambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d
672 (App. Div. 1991) (reinstatement of plaintiff's complaint seeking rescission of a contract to
purchase property which plaintiff discovered was possessed by poltergeists).
103. 193 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
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lier. 1 4 The complaint further stated that such a disclosure was necessary because the information was material and may have affected
the value of the house."0 5 The court held that the complaint stated a
cause of action because the information was of sufficient materiality
to impose a duty of disclosure."0 6
Using the rationale of Lingsch, 07 the Reed court found that the
murders were potentially material information that may have affected the realty's value. In response, the California legislature clarified the breadth of the court's holding through its disclosure

legislation. 0
Courts applying the modern model, particularly the California
standard, have a broader vision of the vendor's disclosure obligation.
The vendor's duty arises whenever the information has the potential
of affecting the value of the bargain. Accordingly, since the materiality threshold is difficult to identify, it is likely that a court would
deem material the fact that John Abele had AIDS while he lived in
the house. Thus, under the modern model, John would be obliged to
reveal his ailment.
This conclusion, however, is anomalous. Since the modern
model is more progressive than the classical model, one would expect
a different outcome. Yet, despite the modern model's attributes, including its promotion of the principles of good faith and fair dealing,
the AIDS-stricken vendor loses.
3. Economic Duty to Disclose
The economic model' 0 9 requires disclosure from the "cheapest
104. See id. at 131.
105. Id. at 133.
106. Id.
107. See supra Lingsch, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 209 (stating that where the "seller fails to
disclose the true facts of [the property's] condition not within the buyer's reach and affecting
the value or desirability of the property, an 'as is' provision is ineffective to relieve the seller of
... his . . . fraud.").
108. -The legislature stated as follows:
(e) The applicability of cases such as Reed v. King... which deals with the obligation of a seller of real property to disclose facts materially affecting the value or
desirability of the property, is not clear as to situations where previous owners or
inhabitants of real property have been afflicted with AIDS. The Legislature intends
to clarify this situation by the enactment of this act.
1986 CAL. STAT. 498 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710.2(e) (West Supp. 1991)).
109. Professor Anthony Kronman's discussion of disclosure obligations from an economic perspective provides the foundation for this third disclosure model. Anthony T.
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUDIES
1 (1978). But cf. Christopher T. Wonnell, The Structure of a General Theory of Nondisclo-
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mistake preventer" 1 0 or the person with "superior access to the relevant information."' Premised on the view that information is a valuable commodity," 2 this model recognizes that "adequate information is a prerequisite to the rational and efficient exchange of other
commodities.""11 3 If either party has inadequate information, a unilateral or mutual mistake can result." 4 According to Professor
Kronman, the risk of having either type of mistake is too great. The
effect of mistake is to impose costs upon "the contracting parties
themselves and [on] society as a whole since the actual occurrence of
a mistake always (potentially) increases the resources which must be
devoted to the process of allocating goods to [the] highest-valuing
5
users." 11
While the economic model acknowledges the need to exchange
information, it also recognizes that requiring disclosure is not always
efficient. To make this point, Kronman distinguishes the party who
has "deliberately acquired information"" ' 6 from the one who has
"casually acquired information.""' 7 The party who deliberately acquires information invests resources and should not be required to
disclose because such a requirement discourages the acquisition and
sure, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 329, 342 (1991). A discussion of additional economic theories
is beyond the scope of this section. See RICHARD A. POSNER. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(4th ed. 1992).
110. Kronman, supra note 109, at 25.
111. Id. at 25 n.70.
112. See id. at 14-15.
113. Wonnell, supra note 109, at 341.
114. Kronman, supra note 109, at 4 ("[i]nformation is the anecdote to mistake").
115. Id. at 2-3.
116. Kronman states:
As it is used here, the term "deliberately acquired information" means information
whose acquisition entails costs which would not have been incurred but for the likelihood, however great, that the information in question would actually be produced.
These costs may include, of course, not only direct search costs ... but the costs of
developing an initial expertise as well. . . . If the costs incurred in acquiring the
information . . . would have been incurred in any case-that is, whether or not the
information was forthcoming-the information may be said to have been casually
acquired. The distinction between deliberately and casually acquired information is
a shorthand way of expressing this economic difference. Although in reality it may
be difficult to determine whether any particular item of information has been acquired in one way or the other, the distinction between these two types of information has-as I hope to show-considerable analytical usefulness.
Id. at 13. According to Professor Kronman, such information is the result of a "deliberate
investment (either in the development of expertise or in actual searching)." Id. at 18.
117. Id. at 14-15 ("[A person] who casually acquires information makes no investment
in its acquisition .... ").
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production of socially useful information."' Alternatively, the party
who casually acquires information should be required to disclose because this person is "likely to be a better (cheaper) mistake-pre.11
venter ..
Kronman illustrates his point as follows:
However one feels about Professor Keeton's moral claim, requiring
the disclosure of latent defects makes good sense from the more
limited perspective offered here. In the first place, it is likely to be
expensive for the buyer to discover such defects; the discovery of a
latent defect will almost always require something more than an
ordinary search. Even where neither party has knowledge of the
defect, it may be efficient to allocate to the seller the risk of a mistaken belief that no defect exists, on the grounds that of the two
parties he is likely to be the cheapest mistake-preventer.1 20
In the Abele/Mays hypothetical, who is the "cheapest mistake
preventer?" 12' 1 If a court applied the economic model, and concluded
that John's condition was like a "latent defect" because it devalued
the realty, the Abele family would be required to disclose John's
118. Id. at 16-17. Underlying Kronman's argument is the idea that when the parties to a
contract have failed to
allocate th[e] risk [of a mistake] by including an appropriate disclaimer in the
terms of their agreement . . . the object of the law of contracts should be (as it is
elsewhere) to reduce transaction costs by providing a legal rule which approximates
the arrangement the parties would have chosen for themselves if they had deliberately addressed the problem.
Id. (citing RICHARD A. POSNER. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw, 73-74 (2d ed. 1977)).
119. Id. at 16. Professor Kronman's explanation is as follows:
If we assume that courts can easily discriminate between those who have acquired information casually and those who have acquired it deliberately, plausible
economic considerations might well justify imposing a duty to disclose on a case-by
case basis.... A party who has casually acquired information is, at the time of the
transaction, likely to be a better (cheaper) mistake-preventer than the mistaken
party with whom he deals-regardless of the fact that both parties initially had equal
access to the information in question. One who has deliberately acquired information is also in a position to prevent the other party's error. But in determining the
cost to the knowledgeable party of preventing the mistake (by disclosure), we must
include whatever investment he has made in acquiring the information in the first
place. This investment will represent a loss to him if the other party can avoid the
contract on the grounds that the party with the information owes him a duty of
disclosure.
If we take this cost into account, it is no longer clear that the party with knowledge is the cheaper mistake-preventer when his knowledge has been deliberately
acquired. Indeed, the opposite conclusion seems more plausible.
Id.
120. Id. at 25 (citation omitted).
121. Id.
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condition to the Mays family. Under this analysis, the Abeles should
assume the risk because they have exclusive access 122 to the confidential medical information at issue.1 23 Alternatively, a court could
conclude that this strain of economic analysis is irrelevant. Although
Professor Kronman's discussion revolves around disclosure obligations, his analysis is premised on the existence of a latent material
defect. A court might conclude that John Abele's condition cannot
be compared to the same. Since, unlike a latent defect, John Abele's
condition will not diminish the realty's habitability, information concerning his medical status is immaterial. Thus, if the information
lacked value, it would not matter how the information was acquired.
In order to analyze the Abeles' disclosure obligation and predict
the outcome under the three different models, certain assumptions
must be made. First, John's condition could not be contracted by a
later occupant of the house. Second, the disclosure could, nonetheless, be regarded as a negative component of value because it might
temporarily affect the realty's market value.
Under the classical model, the common law rule of caveat
emptor restricts the seller's disclosure obligation and only requires
disclosures if certain exceptions exist." 4 Since none of the exceptions
applies, the Abeles would not have to make the disclosure to the
Mays family.
Application of the modern model, however, yields a different result. Under this model, the vendor's disclosure obligation is much
broader because of the view that the vendor has a responsibility to
disclose latent defects to the purchaser in order to avoid an inequitable result.12 5 For example, this would include telling the purchaser
about a defect that might devalue the realty's market value. Thus,
the Abeles would be required to make the disclosure. A similar outcome would be required under the economic model, but for a different reason. There, the Abeles would be forced to make the disclosure
122. It would be illegal for the Mays family to discover the AIDS-specific information.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56 (West 1992) (no medical information can be released by anyone, including medical care providers, without either a detailed statutory authorization from
the patient, proper subpoena, legal search warrant, or other appropriate legal authority); id. at
§§ 56.10, 56.11; ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 410, 305/6 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (identity of any person
upon whom a test has been performed and test results are confidential); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 70.24.105(2) (West 1992) (prevents disclosure of the identity of a person upon whom
an HIV test is performed or the disclosure of the results of that test to persons without statutory authorization).
123. See infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
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because they
preventers.12 6
B.

could

be

regarded

as

the

cheapest

mistake-

Vendor's Interest in Withholding Information Regarding His
Medical Status: Right to Privacy in Medical Information

The second competing interest concerns the Abeles. As vendors,
with one individual having the dual status of being a PWA, they
would not want John's medical status revealed to the public. The
Abeles' interest in withholding such information extends beyond
John's desire to avoid the discomfort of having his illness revealed to
the Mays family. From the PWA's perspective, the repercussions of
1 2 7 If
making a public statement that one has AIDS can be serious.
such a disclosure is made within the course of a business relationship, the PWA's problem is compounded. Despite the fact that such
a disclosure is an unnecessary communication, given the non-existent
risk of contracting the disease, it can be used against the PWA to his
financial detriment. Thus, given the nature of the information and
current public attitudes toward AIDS, a PWA has legitimate reasons, that extend beyond pure embarrassment, for not wanting to
126. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
127. PWAs' experiences range from social stigmatism to ostracism to unemployment to
denial of access to health care. See Chalk v. United States District Court, 840 F.2d 701, 703
(9th Cir. 1988) (teacher with AIDS was removed from teaching duties); Poff v. Caro, 549
A.2d 900, 901 (N.J. 1987) (landlord refused to rent to three gay men for fear of AIDS);
AIDS Spreads to the Courts, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1985, at 61 (gay men who came to work
with rashes or chest colds were getting fired because of AIDS phobia); Doctors Fear AIDS,
Too, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 1987 (doctors refused to treat people with or suspected of having
AIDS); Myra MacPherson, The Children & the Flames of Fear; In Florida, a Family at the
AIDS Flash Point, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 11, 1987, at BI (Florida family whose hemophiliac children tested positive for HIV had their house fire-bombed); Redway v. Los Angeles
County, I AIDS POL'Y & L.(BNA) 6 (Aug. 13, 1986) (action based on similar grounds);
Reginald Stuart, Haitians, Seeking Freedom and Jobs, Find Heartaches Instead in America,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1983, at A18 (Haitians were denied employment because of AIDS fear);
Amy Tarr, The Legal Issues Widen, NAT'L L.J.. Nov. 25, 1985, at I (children with AIDS had
been denied access to schools in Denver, Colorado, New Haven, Connecticut, Troy, Georgia
and Kokomo, Indiana); Undertakers Unit Warns of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1983, at 27
(funeral directors urged not to embalm bodies of PWAs); Urbaniak v. Newton, 2 AIDS POL'Y
& L. (BNA) 8 (Feb. 25, 1987) (PWA's disclosure of his medical status to an insurance company was widely disseminated to his employer and resulted in termination of his employment).
Moreover, a disclosure made during the PWA's lifetime could be detrimental for the
PWA's survivors. See, e.g., Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (D. N.J. 1990). In
Doe, police officers revealed the PWA's medical status to the PWA's neighbors who then contacted the media. Id. The PWA's wife and children successfully claimed that their constitutional rights to privacy had been violated as a result of the disclosure of their loved one's
confidential information. Id. at 382. The court concluded that those sharing a household with
an infected person also suffer from a disclosure. Id. at 385.
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make an unnecessary disclosure.
Given a PWA's concerns, and despite any disclosure duty that
might arise applying property doctrine, is John Abele entitled to
keep his medical status out of the public domain? If John Abele had
any control over the dissemination of information regarding his medical status, a right to keep the information out of the public domain
would arise because of his right to privacy in that information.' 2 8
Federal129 and state 30 courts have uniformly held that information
128. Privacy has its roots in the latin word privatus meaning the quality or state of
being private or apart from the state. VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS.
LESBIANS. AND THE CONSTITUTION 19 (1991); see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Two distinct branches of the right to
privacy exist. The first branch encompasses those rights which exist against the Government.
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (recognizing two types of privacy interests:
"the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and . . . the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions").
The second branch of the right to privacy concerns those general privacy rights which
exist against other individuals. Prosser has identified four categories of claims: 1) intrusion
upon plaintiff's seclusion, solitude, or private affairs; 2) public disclosure of private facts which
would be highly offensive to a person of reasonable sensibilities; 3) publicity which places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and 4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage,
of plaintiff's name or likeness. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 814
(4th ed. 1971). This second branch is the focus of this article; however, a detailed discussion of
the actual claims that the PWA could assert in the event of a privacy violation is beyond the
scope of this article. See SAMAR, supra, at 28-32; see also Dale A. Whitman, Secrecy and
Real Property, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 251, 260-70 (1978) (civil actions may be pursued for appropriation, intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, and holding a plaintiff out to the public in
a false light).
This article asks the preliminary question: Is information about one's body and state of
health within the ambit of matter entitled to privacy protection?
129. The federal courts have held that "[i]nformation about one's body and state of
health is matter which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the 'private enclave
where he may lead a private life.' " United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570,
577 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956)
(Frank, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), quoted in Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (in connection with the Fifth Amendment)).
In accord with the view that this information "stand[s] on a different plane than other
relevant material," Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 577, the courts have imposed a
higher burden of discovery on reports concerning a party's physical and mental condition.
Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 35, with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); see also 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT AND
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2237-38 (1970). The burden is
particularly onerous if the request results in the disclosure of a PWA's identity. See, for example, cases where the moving party sought discovery of alleged AIDS-infected blood donors:
Mason v. Regional Medical Ctr. of Hopkins County, 121 F.R.D. 300, 303 (W.D. Ky. 1988)
(donor's identity was to only be revealed to a limited number of persons); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Ct., 763 P.2d 1003, 1013 (Colo. 1988) (court protected donor's
identity and ordered deposition of donor via written questions); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v.
Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1065 (1988) (donors'
identities only revealed to parties).
130. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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about one's medical condition is private. As a California state court
noted:
To determine whether ...a right of privacy [exists] ...to protect
the medical records here in dispute, we must examine ... the na-

ture of the information sought. A person's medical profile is an
area of privacy infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality
and nature than many areas already judicially recognized and
protected. 3'
This type of information is kept out of the public domain not only to
protect the individual, but also to promote effective diagnosis and
treatment. As the same court stated:
The patient-physician privilege

.

.

creates a zone of privacy whose

purposes are (1) "to preclude the humiliation of the patient that
might follow disclosure of his ailments" . . . and (2) to encourage

the patient's full disclosure to the physician of all information necessary for effective diagnosis and treatment of the patient....
The patient should be able to rest assured with the knowledge
that "the law recognizes the [physician-patient] communications as
confidential, and guards against the possibility of his feelings being
shocked or his reputation tarnished by their subsequent disclosure
.
" The matters disclosed to the physician arise in most sensitive areas often difficult to reveal even to the doctor. Their unauthorized disclosure can provoke more than just simple humiliation
in a fragile personality. .

.

.The individual's right to privacy en-

compasses not only the state of his mind, but also his viscera, detailed complaints of physical ills, and their emotional overtones."'
131. Division of Medical Quality v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 60 (Ct. App. 1979)
(citations omitted). In Gherardini, patients' privacy rights were at issue because the state medical board requested their medical files in connection with an investigation of a San Diego
doctor's competence in treating patients. Id. at 57. In remanding the case, the court required
the medical board to demonstrate the medical records' relevance and materiality to the investigation. Id. at 62. Additionally, the medical board was required to show that the patient's
constitutional rights were not infringed. Id. The court stated that "[i]f disclosure is to be
compelled after the requisite balancing of the juxtaposed rights, and the finding of a compelling state interest, then it should be accomplished only by an order drawn with narrow specificity." Id.
See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 577. In Westinghouse, the court stated as
follows:
Information about one's body and state of health is matter which the individual is
ordinarily entitled to retain within the "'private enclave where he may lead a private
life." It has been recognized in various contexts that medical records and information stand on a different plane than other relevant material.
Id. (citations omitted).
132. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 60 (citations omitted).
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Federal and state statutes are consistent with court decisions.
Federal legislation acknowledges the individual's privacy interest in
personal information such as medical records.13 Most of the current
state confidentiality laws are in accord with federal legislation. State
legislation consists of laws which (1) regard medical records as confidential documents1 34 and (2) forbid the unauthorized disclosure of
information regarding a person who has undergone AIDS testing.' 35
Certain disclosure statutes 3 6 require a property owner to answer truthfully to the best of his knowledge any inquiries regarding
his medical status.1 37 An argument can be made that such a requirement is tantamount to forcing a vendor to place his medical profile
into the public domain. Through the disclosure, the PWA reveals his
medical status to a purchaser who may or may not share the information with other members of the public. The truthful disclosure
requirement takes away the PWA's ability to control dissemination
of his personal diagnosis.1 3 8 Thus, the requirement constitutes an intrusion into his zone of privacy, which is forbidden under existing
federal and state laws." 9 Essentially, legislation that lacks a justifiable basis for its disclosure requirement' 4 is wholly inconsistent with
133. To avoid governmental intrusion into citizens' privacy rights, Congress passed the
Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(a)-(q) (1976). The Act requires departments and
agencies of the executive branch and their employees to observe certain rules regarding the
disclosure of personal information about individuals. Id. Regulations governing access to personal information have also been issued in an effort to minimize intrusions into an individual's
records. 45 C.F.R. §§ 5b.l-5b. 11, 99.1-99.67 (1979) (concerns, among other things, medical
records under control of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare); see also Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976) (medical files are the subject of a specific exemption).
134. See, e.g., GA. EviD. CODE ANN. § 38-718 (Michie 1991).
135. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-904(c) (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 199.25, 199.42 (West 1990). Legislation involving AIDS testing attempts to
carefully monitor the disclosure of the subject's identity and to whom test results may be
given.
136. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-16(2).
138. State confidentiality laws also take away part of the PWA's right to control the
dissemination of information. See. e.g., State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (a
PWA must disclose medical status to sexual partners). They do not mandate a disclosure to
the public at large, but only to those individuals who are at risk of contracting the disease from
the PWA or who are in the business of monitoring the virus to protect public health. Thus, the
AIDS disclosure legislation that requires a truthful disclosure is too intrusive. See infra notes
227-32 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 129-31.
140. Stated more precisely, "to survive a constitutional challenge, a statute compelling
disclosure must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental goal." Murray, supra note
11, at 707.
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state confidentiality statutes.""
Although medical information is confidential, a disclosure can
be mandated if it promotes a legitimate public interest. For example,
in United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.," 2 the court held
that employee medical records could be given to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a federal governmental agency that was conducting a health hazard evaluation of
the corporation's facility. 4 After concluding that the employees'
" ' the court
medical records were entitled to privacy protection, 14
stated the following with respect to how it needed to reconcile competing rights:
Thus, as in most other areas of the law, we must engage in the
delicate task of weighing competing interests. The factors which
should be considered in deciding whether an intrusion into an individual's privacy is justified are the type of record requested, the
information it does or might contain, the potential for harm in any
subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, .

.

. the adequacy of safe-

guards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need for
access, and whether there is an express statutory mandate, articu141. The disclosure of medical information to a physician as opposed to a purchaser
should be differentiated because the former disclosure is privileged. See. e.g., CAL. EVID,
CODE, §§ 990-1007 (West 1992). Since the vendor-purchaser relationship is not privileged,
the same guarantee does not exist. See supra note 56. Although the vendor-purchaser relationship does not trigger the privilege, the information is entitled to be given the same legal significance. A PWA's medical profile remains private regardless of the context.
142. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
143. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, two interests were involved: the employees, whose individual rights of privacy were at stake if the medical reports were disclosed,
and NIOSH, an agency attempting to acquire those records to complete its authorized investigations. Id. at 572. NIOSH initiated a health hazard evaluation of the employer's facility
because workers were experiencing allergic reactions from exposure to certain chemicals. Id.
After making a preliminary assessment, NIOSH sought medical records to determine if there
was a correlation between the environment and the employees' complaints. Id.
The case is instructive even though the competing parties were the government and the
employer, as opposed to private parties. The court relied upon precedent to conclude that the
employees had a privacy interest to protect. The court stated that "[t]he privacy interest asserted in this case falls within the . . . right not to have an individual's private affairs made
public by the government." Id. at 577 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (referring to Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977))). In this context, although private
parties are involved, the same type of information is being sought; namely, information concerning an individual's medical profile. However, since the privacy right in this information is
not absolute, the interests must be balanced, to determine if disclosure is warranted irrespective of the litigant's legal status. Thus, the Westinghouse Elec. Corp. case is helpful in identifying the relevant factors that should be examined.
144. Id. at 577.
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lated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating
toward access. ' "
Applying the factors to the Abele/Mays hypothetical yields a
favorable result for John Abele. With respect to the first two factors
(the type of record requested and the information contained therein),
presumably the court's intention was to assess the type of information that was being requested to determine the severity of the intrusion. 1" In Westinghouse, the employer "ha[d] not produced any evidence to show that the information which the medical records
contain[ed] [was] of such a high degree of sensitivity that the intrusion could be considered severe ....
,,1 7 The court found that
"[m]ost, if not all, of the information in the files [would] be results
[from] routine testing, such as X-rays, blood tests, pulmonary function tests, hearing and visual tests. This material, although private,
was not generally regarded as sensitive." ' 4 8
John's situation is different. Material regarding AIDS is sensitive information. Thus, a disclosure of John's medical status would
constitute a severe intrusion because of the stigma attached to the
disease, 4" as well as the resulting problems that John and his family
might experience.15 0 Moreover, it is impossible to limit the severity
of such an intrusion. Once the PWA states his medical status, an
irreversible intrusion has occurred.
The third factor concerns "the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure.""1 5 This factor is even more useful if
it is expanded to identify the potential harm, as well as the general
consequences, of such a disclosure. As expanded, it looks at the total
effect of a disclosure to third parties.
As applied to the hypothetical, the consequences vary. If John
145. Id. at 578.
146. Although the employer asserted that NIOSH had not met its burden of proof with
respect to showing why it needed to see the entire employee medical files, as opposed to excerpts, the court disagreed and thought that NIOSH's request was justifiable. The court believed that "Westinghouse's proposal that NIOSH be allowed to examine only excerpted data
from the medical records would unduly hamper the NIOSH investigation. The entire file must
be made available ..
" Id. at 576.
147. Id. at 579.
148. Id. However, the court also recognized that some employees might have information in their files that they consider highly sensitive. Id. at 580. Thus, the court required NIOSH to give prior notice to employees so that they could raise a personal claim of privacy. Id.
at 581.
149. See Murray, supra note 11; see also supra note 127.
150. See supra note 127.
151. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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had told the Mays family about his illness before the sale, the consequences could have been dire. 52 Aside from the personal problems
that they may have experienced, 53 the Abeles could have also suffered economically. Specifically, the Mays family could have spread
the word about the Abeles' "AIDS house" and caused its fair market value551 to decline.
From the Mays' perspective, a disclosure to third parties would
have been beneficial. Once disclosed, the house would have been stigmatized, and it is likely that fewer purchase offers would have been
made. 15 5 As a result, if the Abeles acted like reasonable vendors in
such a situation, they would have been more inclined to accept a
lower bid from the Mays family to expedite the sale of their house.
Thus, through the lower bid, the Mays family would benefit economically. They would receive a house that, but for its former occupant,
would have sold at a higher fair market value.
It is difficult to determine whether the realty's stigmatized status would inhibit the Mays' family from getting fair market value
when they later attempted to resell the property. 5 6 Nonetheless,
with respect to the original transaction between the Abele and Mays
families, the potential for harm caused by a subsequent nonconsensual disclosure would be greater for the Abeles.
Analysis of the next factor is less speculative. This factor looks
at "the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure." 57 Simply stated, there are no safeguards in the hypothetical
152. See supra note 127.
153. Id.
154. Fair market value is defined as follows:
The amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. By fair market value is meant the price
in cash, or its equivalent, that the property would have brought at the time of taking, considering its highest and most profitable use, if then offered for sale in the
open market, in competition with other similar properties at or near the location of
the property taken, with a reasonable time allowed to find a purchaser.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 597 (5th ed. 1983).
155. See supra note 42.
156. Case histories reflect the effect of an AIDS disclosure on the PWA's ability to
make a conveyance. See supra note 42. It is unclear whether the stigma on the property would
affect the second buyer's ability to sell the property. Since the stigma arises in the first instance because the PWA is in the house, it would seem that the stigma would follow the
individual, particularly since it does not physically remain in the house after the PWA's departure. See supra note 6. Thus, arguably, unless the subsequent purchaser was also a PWA, he
would not suffer the same potential economic loss. Rather, he would gain by selling the house
and making more of a profit since he acquired the house below fair market value.
157. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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situation because communication between the vendor and purchaser
is not privileged.1 58 Thus, if John Abele told the Mays family about
his illness, secrecy would not be required or expected."' 9
The sixth factor concerns "the degree of need for access." 16
This factor requires the party seeking disclosure to justify his need
for the information.1 61 Since information about one's medical profile
contains intimate, personal facts, the party seeking the information
should be given as little information as possible.162 Moreover, he
should justify the intrusion into the individual's zone of privacy by
articulating a "reasonable need."' 6 3 Need in this context is difficult
to evaluate, particularly because the party seeking the information is
not the government, but a private individual. When the government
is involved, as in the Westinghouse case, need for the data can be
more easily identified once the public benefit is ascertained.6' However, when private interests are at stake, it is more difficult to predict
or judge the reasonableness of the need.'6 5
The Mays family could raise two potential arguments to support
their assertion that the information was needed. First, the information may be needed for objective reasons. The Mays family may
need to know about John's condition to fully assess the realty's fair
158. See supra note 56.
159. Indeed, this situation is at the other end of the spectrum when compared to Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570. There, the court relied on the lower court's determination
that NIOSH's procedures represented "sufficiently adequate assurance of non-disclosure by
the petitioner [NIOSH]." Id. at 580. Westinghouse had argued that NIOSH's procedures
were inadequate because outside contractors, employed to conduct data processing and analysis, had access to the information. Id. The company questioned the procedures even though
NIOSH deleted individual identifiers, such as names and addresses, before disclosures were
communicated. Id. In this context, prospective buyers would have full access to the vendor's
information.
160. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
161. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 581.
162. Id. at 577-79.
163. Id. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp., the court found that NIOSH had established
such a need for the employees' entire, as opposed to partial, medical file. NIOSH needed the
records in order to be able to compare its findings before and while the employees were exposed to certain substances. Id. at 579.
164. Id. at 579. The public interest used by the court to substantiate the intrusion was
"the interest in occupational safety and health to the employees in the particular plant, employees in other plants, future employees and the public at large is substantial. It ranks with
the other public interests which have been found to justify intrusion into records and information normally considered private." Id.
165. It is obvious that John's disclosure cannot be revealed in degrees; that is, he cannot
partially disclose his condition like a medical file can be partially disclosed. Thus, since the
Mays family will ultimately receive highly sensitive information about John Abele, the remaining question concerns the reasonableness of the Mays' request.
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market value.1"' This argument is supported by the fact that a
house's fair market value can fluctuate depending upon its inhabitants.1 1 7 To use such an argument suggests that the Mays family
168
recognizes that such extrinsic information is relevant.
However, if the identified defect does not devalue the realty in
an absolute sense,"6 9 it seems unethical to conclude that such an argument justifies the purchaser's "reasonable need" for the information. Since John's medical condition could not contaminate the realty, the realty would not actually be affected by his medical status.
Therefore, the objective reason is understandable, yet objectionable
because it promotes discrimination against the vendor.
The Mays family could also assert a "reasonable need" to get
the information for more subjective reasons; namely, because of their
AIDS-phobia or basic concern about living in a house formerly occupied by a PWA. This reason cannot be judged. Since real property
investments are the largest and most significant investments that
most people will make, 70 people have a right to feel comfortable
with their decision.
The last factor examines existing laws or public policy which
may militate toward access to the information . 7' In this scenario,
public policy in favor of access would exist if it were possible to contract AIDS by moving into a residence formerly occupied by a
PWA. In that case, the disclosure would be justified because of the
potential threat to the new owner and, arguably, public health.'7 2
However, in light of current medical knowledge, such a public health
threat does not exist. 73 Moreover, if federal housing laws are ever
166. See supra notes 41-43.
167. National housing studies have examined the effect of race and class on real property values. See generally James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988:
The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049 (1989).
168. See supra note 40.
169. An occupant's AIDS diagnosis is unlike a concrete or physical defect that devalues
the realty. See supra note 74. A physical defect tends to diminish the new purchaser's actual
use and enjoyment of the realty. See supra note 74. The AIDS diagnosis also constitutes a
defect (supra note 41) that can potentially devalue the realty. See supra notes 41-42. However, unlike the typical physical defect, the extent to which this new species of defect interferes
with the purchaser's use and enjoyment depends upon the purchaser's subjective assessment of
its significance. See supra note 43. Although it may not directly impact the purchaser's use
and enjoyment of the property, it may nonetheless concern the purchaser. See infra note 220.
170. See Quintin Johnstone, Major Issues in Real Property Law, 55 Mo. L. REV. 1, 5
(1990).
171. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 176-215 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 6.
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used to ameliorate all forms of discrimination, requiring a disclosure
17 4
may ultimately be deemed illegal.
In earlier analysis, applying the modern and economic disclosure models, the Abeles would have to make a disclosure regarding
John's medical status. Applying privacy standards yields a different
result. Forcing John Abele to reveal that he has AIDS to a prospective purchaser is tantamount. to forcing him to publish a portion of
his medical status. However, since federal and state laws acknowledge and protect a person's privacy interest in medical information,
any mandatory disclosure is questionable, unless required to promote
1 75
a legitimate public interest.
C.

State's Interests

1. Upholding Federal Anti-discrimination Law
Historically, people with diseases have been regarded as outcasts. During the earlier part of the twentieth century, public authorities prosecuted and quarantined those with typhoid, 76 leprosy,17 and smallpox,178 allegedly for public health reasons. Yet, in
some of the quarantine cases, the use of such an extreme measure
was questionable because it was uncertain whether the person being
quarantined had actually contracted the disease 17 1 or would infect

others. 80o
These earlier decisions reflect public disdain for people with diseases. This attitude,' 8 ' as well as the ability to quarantine individu174. See infra notes 194-208 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
176. People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 134 N.E. 815 (I1. 1922) (sustaining indefinite confinement of a typhoid carrier).
177. Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387, 390 (S.C. 1909) (quarantine of a woman suffering
from "anaesthetic" leprosy, even though the disease was only "slightly contagious").
178. Crayton v. Larabee, 116 N.E. 355, 358 (N.Y. 1917) (isolation of a healthy woman
in a house adjoining another house in which smallpox had been diagnosed); see also Highland
v. Schulte, 82 N.W. 62 (Mich. 1900) (residents of both sides of a duplex were quarantined
even though the disease was only identified on one side).
179. Robertson, 134 N.E. at 819 (stating that "[ilt is not necessary that one be actually
sick in order that the health authorities have the right to restrain [one's] liberty by quarantine
regulation"); see also Larabee, 116 N.E. at 358.
180. See, e.g., Varholy v. Sweat, 15 So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla. 1943) (upholding internment
in a venereal disease camp of a married woman who argued that her risk of spreading the
disease was low because her husband was stationed in another state and she lacked immoral
habits).
181. Like many other minorities, people with diseases are outside of the norm, not part
of the majority, and are often subject to various forms of criticism. See supra note 127.
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Current developments in federal1"' and local anti-

discrimination legislation,184 and in constitutional law, 18 5 however,
have had a significant impact on how people with diseases may be

treated.
The evolution of anti-discrimination legislation to protect the
PWA occurred in three phases. The first phase began in the early
twentieth century, most notably when Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act 186 to protect the handicapped. As initially construed
within the Rehabilitation Act, the handicapped did not include people with contagious diseases. 8 7 The Rehabilitation Act's scope was
expanded during the second phase when the Supreme Court decided
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. 188 In Arline, an elementary school teacher with tuberculosis was dismissed from her position
because of the periodic recurrence of her disease.1 8 9 The Court held
that Arline was handicapped within the meaning of Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act.1 90 Through its decision, the Court expanded
the handicapped class to include people with contagious diseases.
However, the Court never reached the issue of whether a PWA
182. See generally, Rosanne Pagano, Quarantine Considered for AIDS Victims, 4 CAL.
L. REV 17 (1984); see also Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1274 (1986).
183. See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1992) (proscribing recipients of federal funds from discriminating against other qualified handicapped individuals).
This statute has also been used as a model for other legislation like the Federal Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988. See infra note 199; see also Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 11 1990) (omnibus federal act prohibiting discrimination
against disabled individuals).
184. See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO. CAL., ORDINANCE 49,985 (Dec. 20, 1985), 3 EMPL.
PRAC. GUIDE (CCH)
20,950B (Dec. 1985) (prohibiting discrimination based on the fact or
perception that a person has AIDS; extends to employment, housing, public accommodations,
educational institutions, and city facilities); Los ANGELES. CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 4, art 5.8
(1985), DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 48, at A-7 (March 12, 1986). These ordinances were
enacted to protect a PWA from discrimination.
185. See generally, Deborah J. Merritt, Communicable Disease and Constitutional
Law: Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 739 (1986) (analysis of the constitutionality of
three controversial proposals for controlling the AIDS epidemic by the use of exclusion from
public schools and certain occupations, and through quarantine within homes or public
institutions).
186. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973); see also Robert Lipshutz, Arline: Real Protection Against
Discrimination for Society's New Outcasts? 17 STETSON L. REV. 517, 522 (1988) (discussing
in detail the Rehabilitation Act and its amendments. Lipshutz also states that the Rehabilitation Act has been called the "Bill of Rights for Handicapped Persons"). Id. at 521.
187. See Lipshutz, supra note 186, at 519.
188. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
189. Id. at 276.
190. Id. at 286, n.15.
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could be considered handicapped.19
The third phase of the evolutionary process, however,
culminated in the inclusion of PWAs into the handicapped class.
Since Arline, federal' 9 2 and state' 9 3 anti-discrimination laws have
consistently included PWAs and, effectively, expanded the protective

anti-discrimination umbrella.
Among existing anti-discrimination laws, 194 federal housing
laws are particularly significant because of their relevance to the underlying question of whether the vendor's handicap should be disclosed.' 95 Congress drafted the housing laws1 96 to eliminate the
badges and incidents of slavery that continue to manifest themselves
197
through housing discrimination and neighborhood segregation.
Fundamentally, the Fair Housing Act of 1968198 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988... reflect Congress' intent to establish
remedial laws to provide fair housing throughout the United States.
As suggested by one court, the premise underlying the original Fair
Housing Act was that certain factors like race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin had to be identified as impermissible characteristics so that housing discrimination could be thwarted for a prospective purchaser or tenant.
191. Id. at 282, n.7.
192. See Chalk, 840 F.2d at 703 (reversing denial of preliminary injunction seeking
reinstatement of teacher with AIDS to classroom duties under Rehabilitation Act); Martinez
v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding AIDS is a handicap under
Rehabilitation Act); Baxter v. City of Belleville, Ill., 720 F. Supp. 720, 730 (S.D. Ill. 1989)
(concluding HIV carriers are handicapped under Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(1976)); Robertson v. Granite City Comm. Unit Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (S.D. Ill.
1988) (holding that student with AIDS-related complex is handicapped under Rehabilitation
Act).
193. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Fair Employment Hous. Comm'n, 261 Cal. Rptr. 197
(Ct. App. 1989); M.A.E. v. Doe & Roe, 566 A.2d 285, 287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
194. See supra note 183.
195. See supra notes 9-12.
196. See infra notes 198-99.
197. Kushner, supra note 167, at 1051.
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1982) [hereinafter "1968 Act"].
199. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (Supp. 1993) expands the 1968 Act, supra note 198, and
provides the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes engaging
in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in
making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin.
Id. § 3605(a) (emphasis added).

1993]

THE AIDS INFLUENCE

Like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
et seq., the Fair Housing Act was enacted to ensure the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of impermissible characteristics ....
Congress designed it to prohibit "all forms of discrimination, sophisticated as well as simple-minded. . . ." The Act,

therefore, is to be construed generously to ensure the prompt and
effective elimination of all traces of discrimination within the hous200
ing field.
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 furthers Congress'
attempt to ameliorate discrimination by adding a person's handicap
to the original list of impermissible factors.2 0 1 Within the amended
Act, the use of a person's handicap is prohibited at two significant
stages of the real estate transaction: the appraisal period and the
bargaining period.
The "Appraisal Exemption" provides that an appraiser cannot
consider a person's handicap: "Nothing in this subchapter prohibits
a person engaged in the business of furnishing appraisals of real
property to take into consideration factors other than race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handicap or familial status."20 2 The Fair
Housing Amendments Act also prohibits a person's handicap from
being used to entice or discourage a person from seeking property to
purchase:
[It is unlawful] [t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made,
printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with
respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 03
The former provisions could be interpreted to suggest that Congress
acknowledges the discrimination that transpires when a person's
handicap is improperly considered. This is a reasonable interpretation, particularly given the "Appraisal Exemption." It forbids an ap200. United States v. City of Parma, Ohio, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(citations omitted), rev'd in part on other grounds, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 926 (1982). Typically, vendors have not been plaintiffs. See infra note 204.
201. Under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, familial status and handicap
were added to the original factors which included race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3605(c).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(c) (emphasis added).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
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praiser from considering a person's handicap when the appraiser is
evaluating the realty. If the handicap was considered, at least one
result might be diminution of the property's value. Effectively,
through this provision, Congress is acknowledging the Abeles' plight.
A handicap is an impermissible factor that should not be considered
because it may negatively influence the transaction.
Assuming that Congress acknowledges the discriminatory effect
of improperly considering a person's handicap, it is possible to conceive of an expansion of the fair housing laws to protect handicapped
vendors like the Abeles. Historically, the courts have not used the
fair housing laws to protect vendors, although the courts have liberally construed such laws."" Earlier decisions which analyzed the
original factors 0 5 concluded that the factors could not be used to
any degree to affect the real estate transaction. 06 Thus, they could
07
neither be used as a basis upon which a housing decision is made
nor as a condition precedent upon which a housing arrangement is
based. 08
Given Congress' decision to include the handicapped within the
Fair Housing Amendments Act, each state has an additional mandate. Each state must acknowledge and protect a new potential victim of discrimination, the PWA. Relative to other victims of housing
discrimination, the discrimination that could be experienced by the
PWA is as troublesome, although distinguishable. The PWA faces
the potential problem of being restricted from fully profiting from
the sale of his realty because once the handicap is disclosed, it be204. See generally Kushner, supra note 167; F. Willis Caruso & William H. Jones, Fair
Housing in the 1990's: An Overview of Recent Developments and Prognosis of Their Impact,
22 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 421 (1989).
Historically, plaintiffs have included a prospective buyer or tenant, not a seller. See id. at
435. However, if the fair housing laws are going to eliminate all traces of discrimination, they
must ultimately give standing to "all injured persons.
... Id. at 432. Thus, like any other
plaintiff, the vendor should be given the opportunity to establish a prima facie case if the
disclosure of his handicap has a discriminatory effect.
205. The original factors excluded "familial status" and a "handicap." See supra note
202.
206. See, e.g., Smith v. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1970); United
States v. L & H Land Corp., 407 F. Supp. 576, 580 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
207. See, e.g., Smith v. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d at 349-50 ("[Rlace is an impermissible factor in an apartment rental decision and .. . it cannot be brushed aside because it was
neither the sole reason for discrimination nor the total factor of discrimination. We find no
acceptable place in the law for partial racial discrimination.") (emphasis added).
208. United States v. L & H Land Corp., 407 F. Supp. at 580 (verbal statements made
to white tenants indicating that they were not permitted to have black guests violated 42
U.S.C. § 3604(c)).
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comes a negative component of value.2 0 9
2.

Protecting Public Health: Monitoring Epidemics

Each state has an obligation to maintain public health.2 1 ° The
incidence of AIDS has reached epidemic proportions 211 and threatens public health within the United States more than any other existing malady, particularly because it is currently incurable. Since
AIDS is a recognized problem, any AIDS law must also be consistent with and further public health goals.
In combating public health problems, a state engages in a balancing test to compare the individual's and state's respective interests.212 Private rights often yield to public interests.2 13 If the circumstances suggest that the likelihood of contracting the disease is
minimal, however, why implement unnecessary disclosure requirements?21 4 The state's public health goals are not furthered by disclosure if there is no possibility of contracting the virus.
In this section, the disclosure's propriety is challenged. The Fair
Housing Amendments Act if broadly applied could prohibit the disclosure of a PWA's handicap because its disclosure could influence
the outcome of the real estate transaction. Thus, with this interpretation of federal housing law, the Abeles could assert that they could
not disclose John's handicap without violating the law. 21" Furthermore, a state's interest in protecting public health is not promoted by
requiring a disclosure. If anything, it will discourage a PWA from
209.
210.

See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
See Wendy A. Weber, AIDS: Legal Issues in Search of a Cure, 14 WM. MITCHELL
575, 602-11 (1988) (extensive discussion of the constitutional basis of public health

L. REV.
law).
211. See generally Larry Gostin, A Decade of Maturing Epidemic: An Assessment and
Directions for Future Public Policy, 16 AM. JL. & MED. I (1990).
212. Weber, supra note 210, at 611.
213. See Edward A. Fallone, Preserving the Public Health: A Proposal to Quarantine
Recalcitrant AIDS Carriers,68 B.U. L. REV. 441, 463 (1988) ("[p]rotection of public health
is 'one of the first duties of the state,' . . . private rights may have to yield to [the interests] of
the general public").
214. For the Abeles, a mandatory disclosure may be unnecessary; however, it is necessary in other contexts. Simply, the greater the likelihood of contracting the disease from the
PWA, the greater the PWA's disclosure duty to the individual at risk. See State v. Stark, 832
P.2d 109, 116 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
215. The Fair Housing Amendments Act preempts state law that purports to permit a
discriminatory housing practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 3615; accord Op. Att'y Gen. Tex. No. JM1093, 5725 (Sept. 5, 1989). Thus, if the Fair Housing Amendments Act is broadly interpreted,
disclosure legislation that forces a PWA to disclose his handicap could be in violation of federal law.
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seeking help if he thinks that his privacy rights can be so easily
invaded.
Part I of this article weighed the competing interests involved in
the hypothetical real estate transaction. The initial section was devoid of any reference to the existing disclosure legislation so that the
basic problem facing the parties could be examined from each perspective. Having resolved that the Abeles' plight justifies the conclusion that an AIDS-specific disclosure is unnecessary, the next section
critiques the existing disclosure statutes.
PART

A.

II: CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LEGISLATION

Disclosure Legislation Should Have Its Own Identity

Some of the disclosure legislation is AIDS-specific. 1 6 However,
other statutes have broader application. They affect disclosures regarding AIDS, as well as other incidents that may have occurred
within the realty. Utah's statute is representative of broad disclosure
statutes.117 Section 57-1-37(2) of the act provides that neither an
owner nor his agent is liable for failing to disclose that the property
is stigmatized."
"Stigmatized" is defined as follows:
(a) the site or suspected site of a homicide, other felony, or suicide;
or

(b) the dwelling place of a person infected, or suspected of being
infected, with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, or any other
infectious disease that the Utah Department of Health determines
21 9
cannot be transferred by occupancy of a dwelling place.
At a glance, the Utah-type statutes are not problematic. The
fact that the property was the dwelling place of a person infected
with AIDS may, like the other factors, stigmatize the property. 2
216. Kentucky's statute is representative of AIDS specific legislation. It states in part:
"The fact that an occupant of real property is infected or has been infected with human immunodeficiency virus or diagnosed with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome is not a material
fact that shall be disclosed in a real estate transaction." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.250(1);
see also TEx. REV. Ci. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 15(c).
217. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-1(4).
218. Id. § 57-1-37(2).
219. Id. § 57-1-1(4). Other statutes treat these factors similarly because they have
"psychologically impacted" the property. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-513.
220. Purchasers, like other consumers, act rationally and irrationally. The fact that a
former occupant committed suicide or died from an illness complicated by the AIDS virus
while in the realty might disturb some prospective purchasers more than others. However, it is
difficult to predict how many purchasers would be disturbed, and unfair to decide whether
such a feeling is rational or irrational. It is possible to predict that most purchasers would be
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Indeed, the AIDS factor is similar to the other factors 221 because,
although AIDS does not have any effect on the suitability of the
homeowners, it constitutes a
property for occupancy by subsequent
222
negative component of value.
All factors, however, are not created equal. Even though the
factors can have the same effect on a purchaser, the resulting stigma
from the AIDS disclosure is more severe because of the nature of the.
disease. Given the many dimensions of the AIDS factor and its inherent complexity, it should not be equated with the other factors.
The competing interests of the parties involved reflect its many
dimensions. The parties with interests involved may be the following:

(1) the vendor, who risks humiliation because of his affliction (or
because of his association with someone who had the virus); (2) the
purchaser, who is simply trying to get a good bargain; and (3) the
state, that is trying to avoid hysteria about an epidemic and, at the
same time, protect its citizens from discrimination. 2 a To adequately
concerned that the property was considered defective, tainted or stigmatized. With such a fear,
most purchasers would want to acquire the realty for less than the vendor offered to justify the
risk that the property might not sell or might sell for less than its market value at a later time.
See infra note 222. Thus, irrespective of the purchaser's subjective assessment of the property,
he would be hesitant because of the risk inherent in acquiring stigmatized property. The realty's market value could decline because of market forces and the purchaser's own efforts.
The realty's market value reduction could occur as a result of the decline in demand for the
realty. If fewer people were interested in the property, the vendor would be more inclined to
lower the price so that the defective property could be sold. In addition, the market value could
potentially decline even further if the purchaser used the existence of the negative component
of value as a bargaining tool. The purchaser could try to convince the vendor that the property's value was worth even less because of the stigma.
221. An additional factor that has "stigmatized" property has been the existence of
poltergeists or ghosts or goblins within the realty. See Sambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d
672 (App. Div. 1991). The analysis regarding the other factors (suicide and homicide) applies
to the above referenced factor as well. See Murray, supra note 11, at 689.
222. See supra notes 40-43. It is difficult to predict how long any of the factors might
stigmatize the realty and affect its market value. Eventually, in the long run, the stigma should
become less significant, unless it becomes permanently associated with the realty. This permanent association could take place if the realty's market value, as affected by the stigma, was
dropped substantially below that of comparable houses in the area and stayed well below the
other houses despite the passage of time. A permanent association could be easily accomplished if the house were conveyed numerous times within a short span of time.
223. In addition, more than the other two factors, the AIDS factor is linked to a person's identity, an individual whom the public fears or criticizes because he has AIDS. These
sentiments were expressed by residents who did not want a special use permit to be issued so
that an AIDS hospice could be opened in their. community:
Among the reasons expressed by Residents' Committee members for opposing the
hospice are the possibility that mosquitoes might transmit the AIDS virus to the
community; the undesirability of having former drug users and homosexuals living
in Sabana Ward; the belief that the hospice site is flood prone, thus giving rise to a
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accommodate all of these interests, the disclosure legislation must
differentiate the AIDS factor from the other factors. Disclosure legislation concerning the AIDS factor must not only inhibit the disclosure of immaterial information, but also reflect the public policy
objective of forcing people to acknowledge PWAs' privacy rights. Inclusion of the other factors in the same statute with the AIDS factor
makes an extremely complex problem trivial.
B.

Disclosure Legislation Should Not Undermine Its Objective

Types II and 11I224 of the existing statutes undermine the disclosure legislation's ideal objective in varying degrees. Disclosure
legislation should convey the uncompromising position that information regarding the vendor's health status need not be disclosed, unless medical evidence establishes that a subsequent occupant is at
risk of contracting the virus. Since there is no known risk of contracting the virus by moving into a residence once occupied by a
PWA, there is no threat. Thus, for now, a disclosure is unnecessary.
However, since Types II and III allow the prospective purchaser to
acquire the information, they fail to meet the ideal objective.
The Type II statutes are two dimensional. Typically, the first
section of these statutes precludes a cause of action against an owner
or the owner's agent for failing to disclose that an occupant is infected with a contagious disease.22 5 The Georgia statute is typical
and provides as follows:
No cause of action shall arise against an owner of real property or
the agent of such owner for the failure to disclose in any real estate
transaction the fact or suspicion that such property:
(1) Is or was occupied by a person who was infected with a
virus or any other disease which has been determined by
medical evidence as being highly unlikely to be transmitted
through the occupancy of a dwelling place presently or previously occupied by such an infected person .
risk of contamination through inundation; the risk of transmitting AIDS-related infections such as pneumonia; the risk that the hospice might decrease the value of
surrounding property; the risk that hospice residents might pose a danger to students attending a nearby school.
Association of Relatives and Friends of Aids Patients v. Regulations and Permits Admin., 740
F. Supp. 95, 99 (D. P.R. 1990).
224. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-270(B).
226. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-16(1).

1993]

THE AIDS INFLUENCE

The second section of the Type II statutes, either explicitly2 2 7 or implicitly, 228 provides that an owner and the owner's agent 229 must respond truthfully to direct inquiries regarding the occupant's, health
status. The Georgia statute provides: "[A]n owner or the agent of
such owner shall answer truthfully to the best of such owner's or
agent's knowledge, any question concerning the [aforementioned
provisions] ."230
As drafted, the two sections in the Type II statutes are contradictory. In the first section, purchasers lose their ability to sue vendors who fail to disclose the information. However, in the second
section, the purchaser is given a loophole. Essentially, the purchaser
is able to ascertain the very information that the vendor in the first
section is not obligated to disclose.
The Type II statutes are also deficient because they hinder that
which they should be attempting to further. Arguably, such legislation has the potential to be dispositive in lawsuits involving disclosure conflicts between PWAs and purchasers. However, as drafted
each one fails to facilitate a resolution of the conflict. Instead, the
statutes open a Pandora's box. By shifting the burden to the vendor
to make a truthful disclosure of the same information that each statute also makes unavailable to the purchaser in the first instance, the
statutes provide a fertile setting for litigation. Purchasers are always
in a position to assert that such inquiries were made, yet never addressed. Thus, ultimately, the purchaser's loophole not only destroys
the statutes' effectiveness but creates a breeding ground for
litigation.
The Type III statutes are less deficient than the Type II statutes, but also problematic. As noted earlier, the Type III statutes are
a hybrid of Types I and II. As with those statutes, each one states
that a cause of action cannot be maintained against owners for fail23 1
ure to disclose whether the real estate was occupied by a PWA.
227. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-270(D) (owner or agent is not protected against intentional misrepresentation); N.C GEN. STAT § 39-50 (seller may not knowingly make a false
statement); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710.2(d) (owner or agent may not make an intentional
misrepresentation).
228. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 15(c) (agent shall "provide the information to a potential purchaser or lessee of the real property on receiving a specific request for
the information from the potential purchaser or lessee").
229. In certain states, the prohibition against making a misrepresentation of fact, or
false statement only applies to the agent. Id.
230.

GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-16(2).

231.

See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-513B (1989).
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The Type III statutes also share one of the Type II statutes'
negative traits. Like those statutes, the Type III statutes provide the
purchaser with an opportunity to obtain information from the vendor
regarding the occupant's health status. 2 ' Unlike the Type II statutes, however, an inquiry does not obligate a disclosure from the vendor. 3 ' Rather, the purchaser must satisfy two requirements before
the vendor considers making the disclosure. First, the purchaser
234
must be in the process of making a bona fide offer on the property.
Second, the purchaser must prepare a written request for the information and indicate that knowledge of such information is important
to her decision to acquire the property. 235 Thereafter, the owner is
given the option to refuse to make a disclosure.2 3 However, in the
event that a disclosure is made to the purchaser, it must be consis2 37
tent with privacy laws.
The Type III statutes also undermine the disclosure legislation's
objective. Like the Type II statutes, they fail to convey the unequivocal policy thai the information cannot and should not be disclosed.
The only difference between the two types is that the Type III statutes do not require disclosure in response to a direct inquiry.
The Type III statutes' lack of a mandatory disclosure obligation
is commendable. However, the Type III statutes are still ineffective.
They send a mixed message to the purchaser by establishing requirements or conditions precedent for the prospective buyer to satisfy
before the vendor considers revealing the information. On one level,
the message conveyed is that the information is personal to the
owner. Accordingly, before it will be revealed, the buyer must intend
to acquire the property and establish that such information will affect his ability to make a final decision regarding the acquisition. On
another level, the message conveyed is that such information is not
absolutely protected because the purchaser is still given the option of
requesting it from the vendor. Thus, while the Type III statutes
seem to regard the disclosure as the vendor's invaluable, confidential
commodity, by acknowledging the vendor's privacy rights in the information, the vendor is, nonetheless, placed in a "no win" situation.
If the vendor fails to disclose, a presumption will arise that the realty
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-513C.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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was inhabited by a PWA. Thus, the vendor's option is meaningless.
C. Disclosure Legislation Should Shield All Potential Litigants
From Liability
As noted, most of the disclosure legislation states that a cause of
action cannot be stated if information concerning an occupant's
health status is not disclosed to the buyer.138 However, the statutes
vary with respect to who is shielded from liability. Four groups of
statutes exist. Certain statutes only protect the broker-licensee from
2 40
liability;2 39 other statutes protect the owner and the owner's agent.
A third group of statutes shield the owner, the owner's agent and the
transferee's agent from liability.2 41 The fourth group of statutes is
22
silent with respect to who is shielded from liability.
The disclosure legislation should shield all of the parties who
might be sued for failing to disclose. The third group of statutes is
the only one that can pass such a test.2 3 Obviously, in the case of
property that is sold or leased by the vendor, the potential for litigation exists. Furthermore, litigation could also arise against the vendor's agent if the agent handled the transaction. The less obvious,
yet potential litigant, is the transferee's agent. He could also be subjected to a lawsuit despite his alliance with the purchaser. Thus, all
three individuals should be shielded. In so doing, the disclosure legislation is drafted broadly enough to accommodate potential lawsuits.
D. Disclosure Legislation Should Promote the Vendor's Right to
Privacy
Most of the statutes provide, without any restriction, that a
cause of action cannot be stated against the owner or owner's agent.
However, the California statute is ambiguous and appears to depart
from the norm." Section 1710.2(a) provides in part:
238.

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-16(1).

239. ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 225, § 455/31.1; see also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
6573a, § 15(c).

240.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-329dd; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.565.2; S.C.

CODE ANN. § 40-57-270(B); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-37(2).
241. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1710.2(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.25(2); Ky. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 207.250(2); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-513B; OR. REV. STAT. § 93.275(1).
242.
243.

See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-50.
See supra note 241. The fourth group of statutes might also pass the test. The

failure to specifically list the statute's beneficiaries suggests that everyone benefits. See supra
note 242.

244.

See supra note 226. The California statute is ambiguous and could be interpreted

in two ways. One interpretation suggests that all deaths occurring upon the property within the
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No cause of action arises against an owner of real property or his
or her agent, or any agent of a transferee of real property, for the
failure to disclose to the transferee the occurrence of an occupant's
death upon the realty property or the manner of death where the
death has occurred more than three years prior to the date the
transferee offers to purchase, lease, or rent the property, or that an
occupant of that property was afflicted with, or died from,
[HIV].245

This section has two inconsistent parts. If the death occurred more
than three years before the transferee submits an offer to engage in
the transaction, the first portion shields the transferor, his agent, and
the transferee's agent ("transferor") from having a cause of action
stated against them if any of them fails to disclose the occurrence or
manner of an occupant's death. 4 6 Within the same paragraph, another portion of the section provides that a cause of action does not
arise against the transferor if the same fails to disclose an occupant's
affliction with, or death as a result of, HIV. Thus, unlike the first
portion of the section, the latter portion appears2 47 to provide the
transferor with a blanket of protection. Irrespective of when an occupant with HIV lived or died within the realty, a transferee is precluded from stating a cause of action against the transferor for failure to disclose.
The reason for the inconsistency between the two portions of the
section is unclear. Obviously, if the transferor is provided with unlimited protection if he fails to disclose that an occupant had or died
last three years may. have to be disclosed since a failure to disclose would enable a transferee
to state a cause of action against the transferor. This is the more logical interpretation. If this
is how the statute is applied, this is ineffective because a time limitation only serves to limit the
transferor's privacy right. The transferee should be precluded from stating a cause of action
irrespective of when the death occurred.
Another interpretation is also possible. This alternative suggests that the former interpretation does not apply to a disclosure concerning an occupant's HIV-related death. Rather, the
transferor could avoid liability even if he fails to disclose that an occupant has died from HIV
within the last three years. See infra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
245. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1710.2(a).
246. Id.
247. As drafted, the three year limitation only appears to apply to deaths unrelated to
HIV. The three year limitation appears immediately before the comma that separates those
two portions of the statute. Id. Moreover, if the section was not differentiating an HIV-related
death from a death caused by other causes, it would have been unnecessary to mention death
again in connection with the HIV disclosure. Thus, the statute could have read, for example,
that no cause of arises against an owner of real property ... for the failure to disclose to the
transferee . . . that an occupant of the property was afflicted with HIV. If "or died from [sic]
HIV" is deleted, the suggestion is that the time limitation applies to deaths irrespective of the
cause.

19931

THEAIDS INFLUENCE

from HIV, the statute is as effective as other existing disclosure statutes-at least insofar as it protects the vendor's privacy right by
making the disclosure immaterial. However, the first portion of the
section that establishes the three year time limit undermines the section's effectiveness. If a transferor cannot avoid claims when he fails
to make disclosures about recent deaths, yet can avoid claims for
recent deaths when the occupant died from HIV, a potential problem
could arise. If a transferee determines that someone has died within
the realty within the last three years, but does not know the cause of
death, he might file a lawsuit. As a result, once the court determines
that the occupant's death was HIV-related, it would dismiss the action. The problem, however, is that as a result of having to determine the cause of death, the transferor's ability to control the disclosure of the information is taken away. Thus, the time limitation
can potentially undermine the statute's effectiveness. Accordingly, to
protect the transferor's right to privacy, the statute should not have a
time limitation placed upon the protection given to the transferor,
even if the limitation only concerns deaths from causes unrelated to
HIV.
PART

III: CONCLUSION

In a real estate transaction, the vendor's disclosure obligation,
and a court's interpretation of the same, is unpredictable. Indeed,
the fact that certain states have enacted disclosure legislation suggests that they are in accord with this conclusion. The modern quest
to impose a higher standard of good faith and fair dealing has effectively created a more onerous burden for the vendor, but muddled
the meaning of materiality. As a result, the vendor cannot always
predict what must be disclosed, particularly if the applicable standard is subjective as opposed to objective. Alternatively, the purchaser has been given more ammunition to request information because the pool of available information is expanding.
Existing disclosure legislation seeks to clarify the vendor's disclosure obligation-at least with respect to the disclosure of information about one's medical status. Because of the nature of the information subject to be disclosed, however, disclosure legislation must
do more. It must also seek to serve an "educative function"24 8 by
248. Education can be used to contain the AIDS epidemic. See, e.g., Robert Roden,
Educating Through the Law: The Los Angeles AIDS DiscriminationOrdinance, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 1410, 1423 (1986). Roden states as follows:
[E]ducation is currently the best defense against the AIDS epidemic. Until the pub-
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promoting a public policy of non-discrimination against PWAs. Such
a policy is consistent with the ever expanding umbrella of federal
and state anti-discrimination laws.
Accordingly, the Type V statute should reflect an attempt to
clarify the vendor's disclosure obligation and advance an anti-discrimination policy. The first goal can be accomplished by using the
Type I statute as a base. In addition to avoiding the problems inherent with existing disclosure statutes,24 9 the Type V statute must also
provide that the information is outside of the pool of available information, thereby making it impossible for the vendor to voluntarily
disclose it250 or for the prospective purchaser to discover it.
The Type V statute must also go beyond the Type I model to
accomplish its second goal. To promote an anti-discrimination policy,
the statute must also penalize2 51 individuals who discover information about the vendor's AIDS diagnosis. Such a drastic measure may
guarantee compliance with the law.
Thus, in a jurisdiction with a Type V statute, the Mays family
would be unable to sue Mary Abele. Moreover, if the Mays family
had asked whether John Abele had AIDS, the Abeles would not
have had an obligation to make a disclosure. Alternatively, if the
Abeles had revealed John's medical status to the Mays family, and if
lic understands how to avoid exposure to the virus, the disease will not be contained.
Until the public believes that casual contact with AIDS victims poses little or no
risk, discrimination based on fear will not be eliminated.
Id. at 1423 (citations omitted). Roden also asserts that the law is "an educational medium."
Id. at 1424. Thus, "[t]he law as educator [can] see[k] 'to change ideas by influencing behavior' " through the enactment of "educative legislation." Id. at 1425.
249. See supra notes 216-47 and accompanying text.
250. This proposal raises First Amendment issues which are beyond the scope of this
article. However, in the interest of protecting the frightened vendor who is unaware of his
right to decline to volunteer such information (see supra notes 129-42 and accompanying
text), denying a vendor such a First Amendment right may be in his best interest. Moreover,
by completely withdrawing the information from the pool of available information, it is easier
to avoid a potential discriminatory effect.
251. The availability of actual and punitive damages, plus costs and attorney's fees,
gives "incentives" to PWAs (who have experienced discrimination) to pursue their claims. The
awards also "stand as deterrents against discriminatory behavior." Roden, supra note 248, at
1437; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (West Supp. 1993) (in a civil lawsuit, if a discriminatory
housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, the court may award the same damages).
Scholars are critical of punitive damages. See, e.g., John Dwight Ingram, Punitive Damages Should Be Abolished. 17 CAP. L. REv. 205 (1988) (punitive damages should not flourish,
but should be abolished because they are outdated); Kurt M. Zitzer, Punitive Damages: A
Cat's Clavicle in Modern Civil Law, 22 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 657 (1989) (use of punitive
damages should be abandoned to maintain the distinction between civil and criminal laws).
However, if they deter objectionable behavior, they may be necessary.
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the Mays family had used that information to the Abeles' detriment,
the Abeles would have been in a position to file a civil suit against
the Mays family. Actual damages could have been computed by determining the difference between the house's market value and what
the Mays family actually paid for the realty. Punitive damages
would have also been available against the Mays family if their behavior had evinced a "flagrant" disregard2 52 for the Abeles' rights.
The Type V disclosure legislation reflects an attempt to acknowledge the rights and responsibilities of all of the parties involved
in a residential real estate transaction. Such legislation is consistent
with our nation's democratic spirit.

252.

See Ingram, supra note 251, at 218.

